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ABSTRACT
Hypotheses

The basic hypothesis

of this study is that

form

of

government, type of

electoral system and socio-economic characteristics influence voter turnout
rates.

The forms of government used as

the basis for analysis in this study are

the mayor-council and the council-manager.

The commission form

of local

government has been omitted because there were too few commission
the

sample

to

prove of value

partisan and nonpartisan.
utilized, i.e,

ballot, not

in the analysis.

The

The types

whether or not the

party affiliation of the candidate appears on the

whether there exists any actual party

(2)

population homogeneity, and

and mobility refer

from

to

system are

legal definition for nonpartisan and partisan is

activity.

characteristics are divided into three categories:
mobility,

of electoral

cities in

(3)

(1)

The socio-economic

population growth and

social class.

Population growth

percent population change 1950-60 and percent of migrants

different county, respectively.

Population homogeneity refers to the

2

percent of non-whites, and ethnicity (proportion of foreign-born
persons and

percent of persons of foreign and mixed parentage).

Social class refers to

occupation, education, homeownership, and income.

^

Subsidiary Hypotheses

A
is

related subsidiary hypothesis of this study

related to socio-economic characteristics. 2

is that

form

of

government

Because earlier studies have

found varied relationship existing between form of government and socio-

economic environment,

it

is

necessary

to

re-examine their findings as form

of

government and socio-economic characteristics are both hypothesized as being
related to voter turnout.

Consequently, a clearer understanding of the relation-

ship between voter turnout and form of government and socio-economic

characteristics should be provided.

Thus, the following are subsidiary hypotheses

to

be investigated:

For relevant material on participation of social class, see Edgar
Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public
Administration Review 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Robert Alford, "The Role
of Social Class in American Voting Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly
26 (March, 1963), 180-194; and Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of
Local Political Involvement, " American Sociological Review (December, 1968).
,

,

2

“"John Kessel,

"Government Structure and Political Environment: A
American Cities," American Political Science Review 56
615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Govern-

Statistical Note about

(September, 1962),

,

Administrative Science
Scoble, "Political
Harry
and
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford
and Socio-economic Characteristics of Cities," Municipal Year Book (Chicago:

ment and Socio-economic Characteristics

of Suburbs,"

,

International City Manager's Association, 1965).

3

1.

Manager governments are

likely to manifest a more
rapid population growth and population mobility than

mayor-council governments.
2.

Manager governments more than mayor-council
governments are likely to have a higher percentage

of

college-educated persons, a higher percentage of
white-collar workers, a lower percentage of persons
earning $3,000 or less, a higher percentage of persons
earning $10,000 or more, and a higher percentage of

homeowners.
3.

Mayor-council governments are likely to be located
in communities with higher non-white and a higher
ethnic population than manager governments.

Basic Hypothesis
Subsequent to the analysis of the above subsidiary hypotheses, the basic
hypothesized relationship between voter turnout and form of government,
electoral system and socio-economic characteristics will be investigated.

The

specific propositions are:

1.

of government is more likely
encourage and witness greater voter participation
and turnout than manager governments. ^

The mayor-council form
to

2.

Voter turnout

is

likely to be greater

where partisan

elections exist than where nonpartisan elections take
place. Thus, nonpartisanship has the tendency to

reduce voter turnout. 4

^Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University
California Press, I960); and Lee and Alford, j)]D. cit.
4

Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, 0£.

cit.

of

4

3.

Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan
elections are combined with the mayor-council form
of government than where other combinations of
electoral systems and forms of government exist. ^

4. Cities with rapid population growth
will experience low voter turnout.
5.

and high mobility

Voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the
percentage of well-educated (college) persons in the
population increases.

6.

Voter turnout is likely to be higher in those cities with
a higher percentage of white-collar employees, homeowners, and a higher percentage of high income persons
than in cities with high percentages of opposite characteristics.

7.

Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high
percentage of non-white population.

8.

Voter turnout

is

likely to be low in cities with high

ethnic population (i.e.

,

foreign born and population

of native-mixed parentage).

Methodology
This study

is

an offshoot of a larger,

Although the present study

is

more comprehensive

a study of voter turnout in

American

cities in the United States are not a part of this analysis.

cities in four states

York and Texas.
a large

number

was drawn.

°Lee and Alford,

cities, all

A random sample

These four states are California,

These particular states were chosen because:

of cities with

study.

Illinois,

(1)

over 100,000 population; and because

(2)

they

Ibid.

Lee and Robert Alford,

,r

New

each has

Voting Turnout in American Cities,
American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796.
6 Eugene

of
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represent different regions of the country, i.e., the Far West,
North Central,

Northeast and South, respectively.

This does not mean, necessarily, that each

state is ’’representative" of other states in that region.

The

cities range in population size

from 5,000

to

To

250,000.

the collection of data they were categorized in population ranges of

10,000, 10,001-50,000, and 50, 001-250, 000.

maximum sample

of 75 cities

could not be drawn,

number

of cities

was drawn.

all cities for that

came

to

558,

In

In

each

facilitate

5,

of these categories a

cases where the

maximum sample

population size were utilized.

from which data

000-

for cities

were able

The
to

total

be

included in the actual study.

This study was undertaken
turnout in municipal elections.
of

to

explore further the phenomenon of voter

The attempt has been

to analyze certain

government and socio-economic characteristics which may

or determinants and inhibitors to municipal voter turnout.

forms

act as stimulants

Most of

the previous

studies on voter turnout have been conducted on national elections; therefore

many

of the assumptions concerning causal elements of turnout

from such

studies.

were derived

However, a few studies have investigated coter turnout

locally with similar assumptions as a basis.

This study not only investigated

and tested previous assumptions about the local electorate, but introduced
region as an intervening variable.
earlier works, but

in

some cases

In

most cases,

they differ.

the findings confirm those of

6

Generally speaking, socio-economic characteristics were insignificant
in positvely affecting the level of

voter turnout in municipal elections.

In

every instance, they accounted for well below 50 percent of the variation of
turnout in

some

all cities.

But within the limited parameters of accountable variation,

pertinent associations between such socio-economic characteristics and

turnout developed.

Following are some conclusions resulting from the analysis

of socio-economic characteristics:

1.

A

rapidly growing population led to a reduce voter turnout.

2.

Cities with a highly mobile population did not necessarily
experience low voter turnout.

3.

Cities with a higher percentage of well-educated persons

did not necessarily have a larger turnout than cities
with a high percentage of less-well -educated persons.
In general, education (well educated and less well
educated) decreased coter turnout. In mayor-council

however, a large less-wll-educated population
reduced turnout.

cities,

4.

Basically, a high percentage of white collar workers and

homeowners, factors normally associated with high
voter turnout, had a negative effect upon turnout.
Income (high and low) resulted in increased turnout.
5.

Cities with a large non-white population did not
necessarily have low voter turnout. But in manager
cities, non-white population was negatively related
to turnout, while in mayor-council cities a large
non-white population increased turnout, especially
in mayor-council partisan cities in the Northeast

and North Central.

7

6. Ethnicity (i.e.

foreign -born and native -mixed parentage
persons) in large proportions in the population led to
increased turnout in elections. Also, a substantial
,

foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population
resulted in a larger turnout in manager cities than in

mayor-council

The conclusions derived from
1.

cities.

this analysis

were:

Cities with mayor-council governments have a larger
turnout than cities with manager governments, except
in the Northeast, where manager cities had a slightly

higher turnout than mayor-council cities.
2. Basically,

manager governments had

the effect of

discouraging a large turnout.
3.

Cities with nonpartisan elections had a lower voter
turnout than cities with partisan elections.

mayor-council-partisan governments had
a higher turnout than cities with other forms. But
when this relationship was viewed within regions, only
in the North Central was it likely that mayor-councilpartisan cities had a higher turnout than cities with
other combinations of governmental forms and electoral
systems.

4. Cities with

5.

Region as an intervening variable had greater significance
as an explanatory factor for assessing political structures
as determinants of voter turnout than socio-economic
characteristics as determinants of turnout.
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CHAPTER

I

URBAN POLITICS AND THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Introduction

Robert Daland has contended "that

political scientists have

been slow

to

study seriously the impact or urbanization on our governmental institutions and
political life" and that "the field of urban politics has

the

most fragmentary way.

1,1

been investigated only

in

Furthermore, studies done were often descriptive
o

and prescriptive with hardly any explanatory details.

One
Herson, who

of the first critics of the state of affairs in urban politics

in

was

referring to municipal government as a "lost world" wrote

in

1957, "in conceptual construction and in execution, most of the research in
this field falls short of the

minimal requirements for a systematic

^Robert Daland, "Political Science and the Study
American Political Science Review 51 (June, 1957), 507.

of

political

Urbanism,

"

,

2

For a bibliography on studies of this nature, see Allen Richards,
"Local Government Research: A Partial Evaluation, " Public Administration
Review 14 (Autumn, 1954), 271-277; L. J. Herson, "The Lost World of
Municipal Government, " American Political Science Review, 51 (June, 1957),
,

330-345; Daland, Ibid

.

2

science:

for the literature of municipal

facts that have

been gathered with

theories; and at the

same time,

it

little

is

government

is

studied with an array of

regard for the construction of general

beset with theories that have been advanced

without ever being checked against available empirical data. "3

The significance

of theory construction to systematic

research

in

political science in general and urban politics in particular is well recognized

for theory helps to determine the kinds of empirical phenomena which

investigated and

it

by theory may prove

shortcomings

be

provides the guideline for the types of instruments or tools

which will be utilized

the failure to unite

is to

in the investigation.

trivial,

As Easton stated "research untutored

and theory unsupportable by data,

futile.

Thus,

theory with facts or vice versa have been one of the major

of political scientists in their study of

Since Herson's critique in 1957,

much

urban government.

has been written in the field of

urban government and that which has been written has been directed towards
redressing the deficiencies cited by Herson.

A

review of this literature,

however, reflects the uneven nature of the research.

^Herson,

ojd.

cit.,

For example

in 1967,

330.

^ David Easton, "The Current Meaning of Behaviorism in Political

James Charlesworth, The Limits of Behaviorism in Political
Science, The American Academy of Political and Social Science (October,
Science, " in

F!

1962),

3

Norton Long stated, "while the discipline has made some progress
since the earlier dogmas of reform,
explicit the hypothesis underlying

empirical test.
still

He continued,

"

applicable. "

5

its

it

has shown only

fitful

,f

Herson's strictures

However, writing one year

no longer a 'lost world' or site

the discipline that

some

tolerance

concern with making

prescriptions and submitting them to

later,

in his essay.

of' dullsville'.

.

seem

field of political science

Rather than being the laggard

political scientists perceive

and local politics has reentered the mainstream

.

Herbert Jacobs and

Michael Lipsky stated that "state and local politics as a
is

in

it

of

to be, the study of state

of political research.

Could the study of local politics have progressed so astronomically
that in one year

it

has "reentered the mainstream of political research?"

Long being overly pessimistic about the

state of affairs or

Lipsky exaggerating their optimism for future research
is

more probable

where

in

in

Was

were Jacobs and
urban politics?

that the actual state of research in urban politics lies

It

some-

between the above two views.

^Norton E. Long, "Political Science and the City," in Leo Schnore
Social Science and the City (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968), 244.

(ed.),

Herbert Jacobs and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structures, and Power:
An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics, " in Marian
Irish (ed. ), Political Science: Advance of the Discipline (Englewood Cliffs:
6

Prentice Hall, Inc. 1968), 220.

4

Although Jacobs and Lipsky made an unqualified statement about
the

progress of state and local research, they were compelled

remains an unfortunate aridity
Indeed their article

is

to the discussion of

evidence of this point

research studies on the state level, but

was due

community

in that

little at

admit that "there

to

it

politics."^

reviewed an abundance of

the local level.

Of course,

this

partially to the authors' desire to present materials in specific areas of

state and local government.
political scientists

may

But regardless,

it

raises the possibility that

not be researching certain areas of local government.
o

One

of these areas is local municipal voter turnout.

Theories and hypotheses derived from national election studies and

narrow-based municipal election studies have not been subject, with one or two
exceptions,

to the

kind of broad-based comparative test that

better understanding of municipal voter turnout.

chapter

is to

is

Therefore, the purpose of this

clearly delineate by review of the literature, the areas of urban

research which political scientists have concentrated upon and
present study

required for a

is

an attempt to shed

some

light on one neglected

to suggest that the

area - comparative

municipal voter turnout.^

7 Ibid.

,

^ For a

235.

review of

this literature see

Chapter three.

^One study which does systematically examine local elections compara"
tively is Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities,
American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796.

5

The areas

in

which substantial urban research has been conducted are:

reform movement with

(1)

the

(2)

community power studies; and

policy outcomes.

The study

accompanying principles and

its

(3)

institutions;

structure, process, environment and

of "metropolitan

government"

is not dealt

with in

this review. 10

Reformism
The area of municipal government reform

is

replete with studies which

are long on description and prescription, but short on empirical proof.

The following

^

In

an

an indication of the range of materials on metropolitan
areas: John Bollens and Henry Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965); Vincent Ostrom, et. al. "The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, " American Political Science Review
55 (December, 1961), 831-42; Daniel Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional
Political Leadership," The Miami Metropolitan Experiment (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday and Company, 1966); David Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville
Consolidation (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services,
Michigan State University, 1963); Frank Smallwood, Metro Toronto: A Decade
Later (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963); and Michael Danielson,
Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965); Phillip Coulter, Politics of Metropolitan Areas (New
is

,

York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.

,

1967).

^Some studies of this type are: L. S. Rowe, Problems of City
Government (New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1908); John A. Farlie, Municipal
Administration (New York: MacMillan Co., 1920); Frank Goodnow, City
Government in the United States (New York: The Century Co., 1904); William
B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration (New York: MacMillan
,

Co., 1930).

6

era when municipal government was diagnosed as permeated with
corruption, reformers

who valued

efficiency,

evil and

economy, and democracy

government, promulgated certain principles which they envisioned as
treatment for the

ills of

municipal government.

in

the proper

These principles, derived

largely from administrative theory, were elevated to the position of what

Charles Hyneman calls a theology and metaphysics.
inexplicable fact
local

is that

to a

But, the curious

while administrative theory began to change in the 1940 's,

government research

remained attached

lo

in

general and reformist philosophy

theory which was being questioned in

its

in particular

own

field.

^

12

An abundance of literature which describes the activities of bosses
and machines exist. Bosses and machines were, supposedly corrupting influence.
Dayton D. McKean, The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1940); J. T. Salter, Boss Rule (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co.,
1935); Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1937); Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1930); Edward M. Sait, ’’Machines, Political, "
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 9 (Chicago, 1908), 658: For a description of
corruption in several cities see Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New
York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904); Steffens provides a more perceptive
view of the prevalence of corruption - the indifference and dual standards of
the citizenry - in Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt and
Brace, 1931); Bosses and machines provided certain necessary needs of the
people. This view is treated superbly by Robert Merton, ’’The Latent Function of
the Machine, " in Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, Inc. 1957).

Charles S. Hyneman "Administration Reorganization,” in A. N.
Christensen and E. M. Kirkpatrick, The People, and the Politician: Readings
American Government (New York: H. H. Holt and Co. 1941).

in

,

14

administration theory was probably signaled by Herbert
Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1945).

The change

in

7

Some
political

of the principles of

research

in

municipal government were:

out of local government:
legislation

from

reform which provided

(2)

(1)

much

the foundation for

that politics should be taken

that there should be a separation of politics or

the administration of local government;

(3)

that the "business"

of city government should be separated from state and national politics; and
(4)

that local

government should be made more democratic.

arrangements which were thought

to

The

institutional

be conducive to accomplishing these

principles were nonpartisanship elections, council-manager government and the

short ballot.

These principles and many others have come under acute scrutiny by
For instance, nonpartisanship,

political scientists using empirical data.

presently used in 67% of the cities with populations greater than 5,000,

15

was

thought by the reformers as the answer for extricating "politics" from city

government.
activity.

But, nonpartisanship

became a camouflage

for actual partisan

Also, groups not previously influential became politically influential
16

and other unanticipated effects resulted.

15

Municipal Year Book (Chicago:

International City Manager's

Association, 1969).
16

Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations
and A Case Analysis, " American Journal of Sociology 64 (1958), 282-289; G. W.
Pearson, "Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election, " Public Opinion Quarterly 12
(Spring, 1948), 115; Charles Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections,"
Western Political Quarterly 12 (June, 1959), 449-458; Adrian, "Some General
Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections, " American Political Science Review
"The
46 (September, 1952), 766-76; Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian,
"
Political^
an
Americ
Ballot,
Insulation of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan
J.

,

,

,

,

8

Under the council manager system,
separated from administration.
legislative aspect of

The council was

to

manager government, upon close
17
it.

to

was supposed

to

be

be responsible for the

government while the manager, a neutral, competent,

corporate model executive, was

of

politics

be liable for administrative functions.

Council

scrutiny, has not lived up to what was expected

Banfield and Wilson stated that "the expectation that the plan would

reduce cost of local government has been sadly disappointed.
have gone up, not down, after

its

adoption. "

Generally taxes

Administration has not been

Science Review 53 (December, 1959), 1052-63; Charles Gilbert, "Some Aspects
of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities," Midwest Journal of Politics 6 (1962),
345-62; Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal
Elections, " Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (Spring, 1966), 79; Robert Salisbury and
Gordon Black, "Class and party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The
,

,

,

Case of DesMoines, " American Political Science Review 57 (December, 1963),
584-592; Marvin Harder, Nonpartisan Elections: A Political Illusion? (New York
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958); Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship
,

University of California Press, 1960); Charles Gilbert and
Christopher Clague, "Electoral Systems in Large Cities, " Journal of Politics
"
24 (1962), 323 and Robert Morlan, "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis,
National Municipal Review (November, 1949), 485-490.
(Berkeley, Calif:

,

17

For a good study on function and office of manager government see
Leonard White, The City Manager (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927);
also an extensive study of manager government is provided by Harold A. Stone,
Kathryn A. Stone, and Don K. Price, City Manager Government in the United
States (Chicago:

l8

Public Administration Service, 1940).

Edward

C. Banfield and

Vintage Books, 1963), 185.

James Q. Wilson,

City Politics (New York:

9

separated from legislation, for the manager, although publicly shunting a policy
role, has been a chief policy innovator.

The short

ballot,

which would allow voters

candidates, was thought to be the

democratic.

mechanism

for

to personally

know

make

local

democratizing process.

to aid the

government more democratic seemed

Banfield and Wilson noted that

reformers.

manager government)

"it is

instrument for carrying out the popular
This brief review of research

make

its

its

policies

However, these

to have eluded the

not clear that

has always accomplished what

intended - namely by centralizing authority to

their

making local government more

Having only the council held politically responsible for

by the people was also thought
efforts to

19

it

(council-

innovators mainly

local

government an

effective

20
will. "

reformism indicates

in

that only in

recent years have the principles and/or theories of the reform movement been

Charles Adrian, "Leadership and Decision Making in Manager Cities, "
Public Administration Review, 18 (Summer, 1958), 208-13; Karl Bosworth, "The
Manager is a Politician, " Public Administration Review 14 (Autumn, 1954),
253-8; C. A. Harrell and D. G. Weidford, "The City Manager and the Policy
Process, " Public Administration Review 2 (1959), 101-107; and Gladys Kammerer,
et. al.
City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure Termination
,

,

,

,

(Gainesville:

20

University of Florida Monograph Social Sciences, 13 (Winter, 1962).

Banfield and Wilson,

government is discussed also in
Council-Manager Government, "

The democratic aspect of reform
the following: Kent Mathewson, "Democracy in
Public Administration Review 2 (1959), 183-185.
oj).

cit.

,

186.

,

10

subjected to empirical investigations.

These studies open up

possibilities for

other such research which would examine the effects of reformism up
many
other areas and aspects of local government. 21

Community Power
The

local

Studies

community has always been

for researchers.

The many areas

of

a convenient and natural setting

community

restudied with minimal expenditure of money and

life

could be studied and

little

required time.

Community decisions on taxes and bonds, community organization,
and leadership have long been of interest
sociologists.

Replication

many researchers,

However, there was always the problem

from the study

findings

to

is difficult

must be employed

of a single

community

to other

participation,

especially

of generalizing the

communities.

because communities can be atypical, therefore, caution

in generalizing findings.

Political scientists

were slow

to take

advantage of the community as a

natural setting for studies of political leadership and power structure.
ing the question of

who rules or

- to use

Answer-

Harold Lasswell's words "who gets

21

Edmund

Indicative of this trend are the following: Robert Lineberry and
Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities,"

Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 706 and Robert
Lineberry, "Political Structures and Public Policies in American Cities,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,

American

1968).

11

what, when, and how" seemed to have been the special province
of sociologists. 22

Much

of the

research

in

community leadership and power has been

characterized by basic methodological difficulties and implicit ideological
positions.

When

political scientists entered the area in

more than a decade
minded

mid-1950, there ensued

of interdisciplinary controversy between the pluralist-

political scientists

different methodologies.

and the elite-minded sociologists, each utilizing

This struggle between the discipline obscured the

real substantive issues at hand - community leadership and power.
Sociologists have almost unanimously used the positional or reputational

approach
were:

(1)

oo

to

discovering community power. 23 The assumptions of these studies

that an

economic

elite class rules in the local

community;

(2)

that

Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York:

Meridan Books, 1958).
oo

Town

in

Some of these studies are: Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small
Mass Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); Warner,

Yankee City (New Haven: Yale University, 1941); Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd,
Middletown (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1929); ibid., Middletown in Transition
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1937); August B. Hollingshead,
Elmtown's Youth (New York: John Wiley, 1949); Floyd Hunter, Community
Power Structures (Chapel Hill, N.C. University of North Carolina Press,
1953); W. Loyd Warner, Democracy in Jonesville (New York: Harper, 1949);
Free Press, 1958);
E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentleman (Glencoe, III.
Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (New York:
Harcourt and Brace, 1953); for application of the positional approach nationally
see, C. Wright Mills, Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956)
and G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice:

:

,

Hall, 1967).

12

the political and civic leaders occupy a position subordinate to this
economic
elite class; (3) that this

local

community

in its

own

economic

economic

life; (4) that this

interest; and

elite class

economic

between the

and the subordinate non-elite class.

elite class

that in order to discover the

power

one merely determined who occupied the top echelons in the economic,

political and social

realm and also who were most important

policies in the private organizations.
this

elite class rules selfishly - only

that social conflict takes place only

(5)

The positional approach assumed
elite,

dominate the many facets of

approach

is

that those holding

24

The methodological

in influencing

difficulty with

power are a priori defined as occupying top

positions with no attempt to empirically determine whether or not power can

Consequently, "potential" power

be considered synonymous with position.

holders were located, rather than "actual" power holders.

An example

of the reputational approach is the pioneer study of Atlanta

Oc

by Floyd Hunter.

Hunter developed a

14 judges) and asked

them

them

the

for

names

list of

"knowledgeables"

of persons

most on various issues or topics.

24

panel of

whose opinion would influence

This technique resulted

from which

of one-hundred seventy-five influentials

(a

forty

in a list

were arbitrarily

The seminal studies using this method are two studies of Muncie,
Indiana by Robert and Helen Lynd, ibid. and the study of a New England
community by Lloyd Warner, Yankee City ibid.
,

,

25 Hunter, o£. cit

.

13

selected as the top influentials.

was collected on these

A

variety of social background information

influentials.

shared interests which they desired

were interviewed

to

Hunter assumed that these influentials had
to protect

or promote.

Consequently, they

determine their exercise of power and the degree

they interacted with each other.

dominant economic power

elite

to

which

Hunter's methodology led to his finding a

who controlled "Regional

°
City. "

Hunter's study served as a catalyst for propelling political scientists
into the

area of community power studies, most often as critics

methodology.

One

of the first, and

more

critical analyses,

and Kaufman which labeled Hunter's method as

Thomas

was

of Hunter's

that

by Jones

intuitive rather than scientific.

Anton, commenting on the Jones and Kaufman critique noted

27

that:

The review of Hunter's book by Kaufman and Jones
was in some ways an important milestone for political
science. Although, the book was challenged on both
substantive and methodological grounds, the devotion
of so much space to a sociologists work in the Public

Administration Review constituted a recognition of
the relevance of this kind of inquiry for those who
labored in the vineyards of political science and public
administration. Indeed, lurking between every line of
the review was an implicit exhortation to political

26

For a view favorable towards Hunter, and a review of the contribution
of these power studies to political science by sociologists, see Lawrence Herson,
"In the Footsteps of Community Power, " American Political Science Review 55
(December, 1961), 817-30.
,

27

Victor Jones and Herbert Kaufman, "The Mystery of Power, " Public
Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), 205-212.

14

scientists to start working on this problem, if only
to substantiate the belief that Hunter was wrong

about Regional City.
It

2®

did not take political scientists long to ’’start working on this
problem, "

for within a few years a spate of articles appeared challenging Hunter's

methodology and findings. 29 Some of the criticism directed

at Hunter's

methodology were: that his approach produced only "reputation"

for

power

not

actual power exercise; that the approach generalized the scope of influence,

28

Thomas

Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics, " Administrative
Science Quarterly 7 (March 1963), 425-427.
,

29 Delbert C. Miller, "Decision Making
Cliques in

Community Power

Studies," American Journal of Sociology 64 (November, 1958), 299-310;
Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City, " in Morris
Janowitz (ed. ), Community Political Systems (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961);
,

Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political
Science Review 52 (June, 1958), 463-469; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Sociology
of Community Power: A Reassessment, " Social Forces 37 (March, 1959),
232-236; ibid. "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power, "
American Journal of Sociology 25 (October, 1960), 636-644; Peter H. Rossi,
"Community Decision Making," Administrative Science Quarterly 1 (March,
1957), 415-443; Harry M. Scoble, "Yankeetown: Leadership in ThreeRobert E. Agger, "Power
Decision-Making Processes, " in Janowitz, ibid
Attributions in the Local Community: Theoretical and Research Considerations,"
Social Forces 34 (May, 1956); 332-337; and William H. Form and William V.
D’ Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage Among Community Influential in Two
Border Cities, " American Sociological Review 24 (December, 1959), 804-814;
Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games, " American
Journal of Sociology 64 (November, 1958), 251-61; Peter Rossi, "Power and
Community Structure, " Midwest Journal of Politics 4 (November, 1960),
,

,

,

,

,

,

;

,

,

,

,

394-401.

^

,

15

Hunter assumed that influence

i.e„

area; that

be

in

it is

one area meant influence

in

small

is

most

the

The result

elite.

influential,

is that

monolithic power structure.
It is

political scientists in

.

'

of "top influentials"; and that

the assumption

such research

is

was

that there

was a

biased towards finding a

30

commonly recognized

Who Governs

another

doubtful whether the panel of judges and the interviewer could

agreement on basic concepts and standards

by asking 'who

in

that the equivalently significant

community power analysis

to the

word by

Hunter work

Is

Dahl’s

Dahl's approach, unlike Hunter's, introduced the 'pluralists

alternative' or the decision-making approach to the study of

community power.

Dahl thought that by investigating the process through which decisions are

made,
his

it

was possible

to

more

effectively discover the locus of power.

methodology required the selection

Thus

of 'key' issues; the identification of

people who took part in the decision-making process; and account of the
actual behavior of individuals w hile the issue -conflict was being resolved; and
the determination and analysis of specific outcomes.

With this technique, Dahl

°^In addition to the sources in footnote 29, see Nelson W. Polsby,
Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963), and Robert A.
1960).

31

Dahl, ibid

.

Dahl,

Who Governs (New Haven:

Yale University Press,

16

found that, at least, in
elite, but

centered.

many

New Haven,

there was no

identifiable monolithic

elites, that is a pluralism of elites

power

which were executive-

In addition, Dahl found that the influence of each elite changed with

each issue under consideration.

The publication

Who Governs sparked

of

another flurry of articles and

books in which political scientists utilized the decision-making approach."^

However, fundamental and important criticisms
also raised.

33

of the pluralist

model were

For instance, Bachrach and Baratz were concerned with

^Edward

C. Banfield, Political Influence

of Glencoe, 1961); Heinz Eulau,

"A Review

of

the

(New York: The Free Press

Who Governs ? M American

Review 57 (March, 1962), 144-45; H. Douglas Price, "A
Review of Who Governs ? Political Science Quarterly 77 (June, 1962), 269-71;
Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory op cit Wallace S.
Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1960; Paul A. Smith, "The Great Game of Community
Politics, " Midwest Journal of Political Science 9 (February, 1965); Wolfinger,
op cit
Scoble, ojd. cit. Norton Long, "The Local Community As an Ecology
of Games, " o£. cit
Roscoe Martin and Frank Munger, et. al. Decisions in
Syracuse (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).
Political Science

,

,;

,

.

,

.

;

,

.

.

;

;

.

33

,

;

However, some fundamental criticisms

of the pluralist alternative

Thomas

Anton, 0£. cit.; Anton, "Rejoinder
Letters to the Editors, " Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (September, 1963),
257-68; Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions:
An Analytical Framework, " American Political Science Review 57 (September,
"Two Faces of Power. " Administrative Science Quarterly
1963), 632-42; Ibid.

are found

in the following

sources:

,

,

,

,

community power areas has been

(March, 1962), 517-19. Some research in
criticized for being ideological. See these articles for this type of criticism:
Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, "American
Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 285-295; and Robert A. Dahl,
"Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy'", American
Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 296-305.
6

6

17

question of "nondecision. " They argued that by focusing on the processes of

decision-making, the pluralists ignore the pervasive extra-processes by which
issues are also resolved and the results brought

to

bear on the formal process.

Thus, they asked whether "the researcher over-looked the chance that some

person or association could limit decision-making

to relatively

non-controversial

matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals,
not withstanding that there are in the
conflict. "

34

The

community serious but

to the

most controversial,

salient, popular at the

researcher? Dahl does not

means by

'key issues'.

in his study of

Thomas Anton

undue emphasis on individual power

power.

power

pluralist approach requires that 'key issues' are selected.

But, what are the criteria for determining the 'key issues' ?
that are

latent

in

Is

it

moment, or

New Haven

those issues

of interest to

define what he

criticized the pluralist for placing

an attempt to measure community

35

In recent studies of

community power, an attempt has been made

synthesize parts of the decisional and reputational approaches.

34

Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces

35

"Power, Pluralism and Local Politics,

3

of

Power,

36’
0

to

This

" ibid .

" op. cit.

Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Robert E. Agger, Daniel
York: John
Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New
Jersey:
(New
Town
Small
Wiley,
1964); Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a

18

synthesis has led to a different way of looking at community power-comparative

community

study.

Linton

Freeman and

his associates studied leadership in the Syracuse

metropolitan area by comparing the different methods for finding leadership.
Since the type of leaders discovered depended to a large extent on the methodological approach,

Freeman and

his colleagues concluded that "the various

differing approaches to the study of
different types of leaders.

participation

seems

community leadership seem

to

The study of reputation, position or organizational

to get at the "Institutional

leaders." Studies of participa-

tion in decision-making, on the other hand, tap the "Effectors" of

action.

And

uncover

studies of social activity

seem

to

community

seek out the "Activists" who
37

gain entry by dent of sheer commitment, time and energy.

Bedninster Press, 1964); M. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials (New
York: The Free Press, 1964); Linton C. Freeman, et. al. "Locating Leaders
"
in Local Communities: A Comparison of Some Alternative Approaches,
American Sociological Review 28 petober, 1963), 791-798. For another
theoretical scheme, see Rossi, "Power and Community Structure, " o£. cit.
,

37 Linton Freeman, ibid

.

,
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Men

at the

Top 0 8 by Presthus

is

New \ork, Edgewood and Riverview. A

a study of two small communities in

series of decisions were studied using

both the decisional and reputational methodological approaches.

assumed

"that the decisional

method would prove

to

Presthus

be superior to the older

reputational method, " but after deciding to compare his findings by each

approach, he realized the "both methods had something to contribute.

had

its

peculiar strengths and weaknesses.

dominant

in

1,39

He found

Riverview and economic leaders taking the

Each

political leaders

initiative in

Edgewood.

But, Presthus felt that the reputational method should not be used independently

and that some of the assumptions
"the expected

findings, e,g.

of

pluralism were not supported by his

measure

of individual

and organizational

participation in major decisions. " However, in testing both methodological

approaches, Presthus concluded that "each method,

in effect

became

a foil

against which the evidence provided by the other could be tested and modified.

It

soon became clear that the reputationalmethod had a great deal

in refining the

somewhat gross power ascriptions provided by

technique.

OQ

Robert Presthus, o£.
39

40

Ibid.

Ibid.

,

59.

cit.

to contribute

the decisional

1

20

Wildavsky's study of Oberlin, Ohio was undertaken

New Haven

to replicate Dahl's

study and also, like Presthus, to prove the superiority of the

decisional approach.

He studied

all

major decisions

in a

given period.

on his findings, Wildavsky saw the reputational method as having a

chance

in not

naming

the 'leaders'.

Therefore,

in testing both

Based

fifty-fifty

methodological

approaches, Wildavsky selects the decisional as being more effective
the leaders and concludes that the pluralist model is representative of

in

naming

most

cities in the United States.

M. Kent Jenning's Community
in

Influentials

order to check on Hunter's findings.

4
is

a re -study of Atlanta

Jennings, however, used both the

decisional and reputational approaches.

Based on

his investigation, Jennings

did not find an elite structure in Atlanta, especially, a dominant economic elite.
In the Rulers and the Ruled,

more systematic approach

Agger and

to the study of

his associates attempted a

community leadership by devising

typologies of power structures and 'regimes'.

The four types

structures which they delineated were consensual

and competitive mass and competitive

elites.

of

power

mass and consensual

elites

Consensual and competitive

represented the extent of ideological agreement or disagreement, while mass

41
4p

Jennings, 0£.

Agger,

et.

cit.

al., o£. cit.

21

and

elite

referred to the breath of participation.

decision-making process over a period of

In studying

fifteen

years

in

changes in the

two western and

two southern cities, Agger and his colleagues found that both the
reputational
and decisional approaches could be effective
In

summary

to

studying community leadership.

as the study of community leadership has advanced,

political scientists have

have attempted

in

become more systematic

in their investigation

and

devise theoretical schemes and models in an effort to

better understand community power.

Structure, Process, Environment and Policy Outcomes

Research

in state

and local politics witnessed a marked innovation

the i960 's with political scientists attempting to

in

show a relationship between

various political and socio-economic variables and certain policy outcomes.

Hypothesizing that policy outputs are,

socio-economic environment,

in part,

a function of the political-

political scientists, utilizing aggregate data and

multivariate analysis, have found positive correlations between such public
policies as taxation and expenditures and the political-socio-economic environ

ment.

However, there have been few attempts on

the local level,

employing

aggregate voter turnout as an outcome of the political-socio-economic environ
f
ment.

43

43studies which comparatively examine voter turnout in substantial
number of cities are: Eugene Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile,"
Municipal Year Book, (Chicago: International City Manager's Association,

Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American
American Political Science Review 62 (September, 1963, 796.

1963), 95; and
Cities, "

,

22

Literature On State Policy Outcomes

This research innovation has been most noticeable
to state

government.

to the study of

44

in its application

But, such research findings has also been instructive

urban politics.

44

Two early works were V. O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and
Nation (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951) and Duane Lockard, New England State
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). An initial systematic
study was that of Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State
Political Party Strength,” Western Political Quarterly 11 (1958), 494-513;
Studies which have posited environmental factors as important are: Richard
E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic
Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States, ” Journal of Politics,
25 (May, 1963), 265-289; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public
Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American
States, " APSR 60 (March, 1966), 73-82; Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental
Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy, " Midwest Journal of
Political Science 11 (August, 1967), 353-380; Ira Sharkansky, "Economic
and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies
and Deviant Cases, " Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (May, 1967),
173-92; Thomas Dye, Political, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, The
in the American States
,

,

,

,

,

Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969); Ira
Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics
and Public Policy, " APSR 63 (September, 1969), 867-879. Studies which have
emphasized political factors are: Herbert Jacob, "The Consequence of
Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," Social Forces 43 (December, 1964),
"
256-61; Thomas Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States,
Journal of Politics 27 (August, 1965), 586-601; John H. Fenton, People and
Parties in Polities (Glenview, III. Scott Foresman and Co. 1966); Charles F.
Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in
American States, " American Political Science Review 63 (September. 1969),
"
858-868; Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs, in Oliver
Political Research and Political Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard
Garceau (ed.
Politics of Taxing and Spending (New York:

,

,

,

,

:

,

,

),

University Press, 1968), 190-220; Glen W. Fisher, 'Interstate Variation in
State and Local Government Expenditure, " in Robert E. Crews, Jr., State
1968), 501-519.
Politics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
,

One article offers ways of measuring non -expenditure legislation, e.g., Civil
On Measuiing
rights legislation: Charles F. Cnudde and Donald McCrone,
(ed. ), State Politics (Belmont,
Public Policy, " in Robert E. Crews, Jr.
523-530.
Co.
1968),
California: Wadsworth Publishing
,

,
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In the state literature,

Key, Lockard and Fenton have concluded that the

degree of party competition contributes to a variation
policies.

Key

in his study of

in the type of public

southern politics found that multifactional one-

party systems correlated highly in a positive way with conservative policies

which favored those at the upper end of the socio-economic strata; bifactional
competitive systems, on the other hand, were related

favored the poorer or lower classes.
in

to liberal policies

Lockard discovered similar correlations

one party and two-party competitive systems respectively

New England

state politics.

which

in his study of

Fenton also discovered that greater expenditures

for welfare and education existed in those states with two-party competition

rather than a one-party system.

On
measures

investigating welfare policies,

Dawson and Robinson,

utilizing

of inter-party competition and urbanization, income, industrialization

and ethnicity, discovered that the socio-economic factors had more of an
impact on policies than did political factors.

415

Their findings have been

corroborated by Dye, Hofferbert and Sharkansky.

46

In

each case, these

researchers have used socio-economic characteristics as independent variables;
have used welfare and education policies as dependent variables; and have
concentrated on taxation and expenditures as measures of these policies.

AC

4C

Dawson and Robinson,

op. cit.

Dye, Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op.

cit.

8
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However, many important policies cannot be measured
and taxation.

how

McCrone and Cnudde

civil rights legislation can

in

terms

of expenditures

have, for instance attempted to demonstrate

be examined.

47

The measures of inter-party competition have

also

come under

attack.

Inter-party competition has usually been defined as percentage of vote for
particular offices received by each party; length of control of office and whether

or not control was divided between the parties.

Sharkansky and Hofferbert

have stated that "electoral balance or alternation

in office is not 'inter-party

competition' except in the most mechanical sense. "

48

They attempted,

in

their study, to conceptually clarify inter-party competition and the ways in

which

measured.

is

it

Thus
for what

it

the literature of public policies is instructive for what

includes.

omitted which resulted

that

Based upon

"There

is

in

Important variables were probably

magnifying the significance of those variables

their research, Sharkansky and Hofferbert concluded

no single answer to the question:

that has the greatest impact on public policy ?'

47
4

omits as

Particular socio-economic and political factors have

been chosen for a variety of reasons.

included.

it

'Is it politics

or economics

The answer varies with

McCrone and Cnudde, "On Measuring Public

the

Policies, " 0£. cit.

Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics,

and Public Policy, " q£.

ait.

,

867.

1
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dimensions of each phenomena that are

49

at issue. "

echoed by James Clarke when he noted that

"it is

A

similar sentiment was

probable and certainly worthy

of further research that the explanatory importance of socio-economic and
political

process variables will vary with the type

of policy being considered. "50

Literature on Urban Policy Outcomes

Beginning
that

in early I960,

researchers began

explore the significance

to

governmental structures had upon certain urban policy areas.

Some

of

the initial literature posited a relationship between structural variables and

environmental factors, i.e., socio-economic characteristics.

5

These studies

have concluded that young, medium-size, white, high socio-economic status,

low ethnic and rapidly growing cities are more likely

governments than

to

cities with opposite characteristics.

have council-manager

The assumption

in

49
Ibid.

,

878.

^James W.
Political Science

Clarkes, "Environment, Process and Policy,

Review

,

"

American

63 (December, 1969), 1181.

51

John H. Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment:
A Statistical Note about American Cities, " American Political Science Review
56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of
Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs, " Administrative
Science Quarterly 8 (June, 1963), 1-17. Robert Alford and Harry Scoble,
Year
"Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Cities," The Municipal
Book (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965); Edgar
"
Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and Council Manager Plan, Public Admini
,

,

,

Nlonstration Review, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; and Phillip Cutright,
"
in
Stu
dies
Comparative
partisan Electoral Systems in American Cities,

Society and History

,

5

(January, 1963), 212-226.
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this analysis is that cities

economic mold

will

which are inhabited by people of a certain socio-

experience a demand on the part of these people for the

establishment of a particular kind of governmental arrangement.

because governmental structures are more or less

static and have

over decades while environmental factors fluctuate,

it

However,
endured

could be that people

with certain socio-economic characteristics, preferring a particular type of

government locate

in cities

which have

that type of

governmental arrangement.

The linkage between structural variables and socio-economic

factors

have been statistically demonstrated, but these correlations must be tempered

by the fact that cities are not always free

ment because

to

choose their structures

of

govern-

of state requirements and because of individual political behavior

of city inhabitants.

These are intervening variables which are sometimes

overlooked.

There have been several studies which have attempted
mental structure and socio-economic characteristics

outcomes.

52

to

to relate

govern-

various policy

Utilizing socio-economic characteristics as the independent

52 Maurice Pinard "Structural Attachments and Political Support in
Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums, " American Journal of
Sociology 68 (March, 1963), 513-526; Amos Hawley, "Community Power and
Urban Renewal Success, " American Journal of Sociology 68 (January, 1963),
Donald B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain,
422-431; Sherbenou, ojd. cit
,

,

.

;

"Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluoridation
Decisions, " Journal of Politics 28 (February, 1966), 169-196; Robert L.
Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American
" American Political Science Review 61 (September, 1967), 701-716,
,

Cities,

,
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variables, governmental structures as the intervening variables,
and policy

outcomes as

the dependent variables, researchers have endeavored to

demonstrate the impact of various socio-economic factors upon different
policy areas.

Policy areas most often employed in analysis have been welfare,

education, taxation, fluoridation and urban renewal.

Rosenthal and Crain explored the impact of political structures upon
fluoridation decisions in over three-hundred cities.

position on

fluoridation largely decides the outcome.

better chance of success

if

"the political structures provide the

ment and strong parties which
pressures likely

to

that the

mayor's

Fluoridation has a

supported by the mayor or a strong manager.

Rosenthal and Crain also concluded that fluoridation
if

They found

insulate

is

more

likely to be adopted

mechanisms through forms
mayors and managers from

arise on this issue; and that there

is

of govern-

'irregular'

a low level of direct

citizen participation both as a general rule and specifically on the fluoridation

Thomas

R. Dye "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment and Educational
Policy, " Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (August, 1967), 353-380;
Robert Lineberry, "Public Policies in American Cities, " (Unpublished Doctoral
,

Dissertation, microfilmed, University of North Carolina, 1966); Joseph Cepuran,
"

"Policy Outputs in Council-Manager and Non-Council Manager Cities,
Perspectives in Council Manager Government (Iowa, University of Iowa, 1969).
For articles relating other factors to policy areas not commonly studied see:
James Wilson, City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
,

For a review of some of the literature on public policies see:
Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities, " Journal of Politics,

Inc.,

1968).

29 (February, 1967), 94-108.
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decision. "

between

Maurice Pinard, on the other hand, investigated

the

the relationship

community's socio-economic characteristics and fluoridation

referenda.'

His findings led

to the

conclusions that fluoridation referenda

are more successful in a small homogeneous, low unemployment, non-middle class community.
It is

obvious that the difference

in findings of the

two studies

function of the factors which are defined as independent variables.

is

If,

a
for

example, instead of political structures as independent variables, socio-

economic factors are defined as

the independent variables and in place of

socio-economic factors as intervening variables,

political structures are

classified as intervening variables, with fluoridation remaining the dependent

variable,

it

each study would be similar for the

is likely that the findings of

same community.

That

is,

communities

in

which a mayor favored fluoridation

and there was less citizen participation were likely to be small, homogeneous,
low unemployment and non-middle-class.

Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler investigated the impact of
political structures on

policy-making

in cities

over 50,000 population.

55

Two

policy outputs - taxation and expenditure - were related to the socio-economic

J

^Rosenthal and Crain, o£.

54

Pinard,

55
op

.

cit.

cit .

cit.

,

196.

29

and structural characteristics
utilized -

form

of

of cities.

The structural characteristics

government, type of constituency and partisanship

elections - were divided into reformed and unreformed institutions.
institutions

were

elections, while

manager government, non-partisanship and
unreformed

institutions included

partisanship and ward elections.

of

Reformed

at large

mayor-council government,

They discovered

that, with the exception of

expenditures in partisan, mayor-council cities, reformed cities spend and tax
less than unreformed cities.
to conclude that

Consequently, Lineberry and Fowler were able

reformed governments are less responsive

to the conflicts

and cleavages of politics.

Thomas Dye examined

the impact of governmental structure and the

structure of the city's school system upon educational outcomes.

compared

the effects of these structural variables with the effects of the urban

environment, i.e., the socio-economic characteristics.
the urban environment

Thomas Dye,

Dye concluded

that

was more important than structural characteristics

determining educational outcomes.

56

He, then

o£. cit.

in

30

his study of Chicago suburbs,

In

Edgar Sherbenou concluded

expenditures, higher property taxes, and a

more conservative

attitude

debt were associated with the council -manager form of government.
correlation

manager

is partially

cities in

that higher

0

^

towards
This

explained by the middle -class make-up of council-

which the inhabitants are usually wealthy and can afford and

have the willingness to support policies involving high taxation and expenditures.

However, Lineberry and Fowler found ’’reformed,
governments, less responsive

to

a

its effect

common

measures

57
5

,

mayor-council governments.

analyzing the effects of political and socio-economic

factors upon urban policies,

and

council-manager

community characteristics on taxation and

expenditure measures than ’’unreformed, ” i.e.
In addition to

" i.e.,

some researchers have

upon policy outcomes.

58

studied political culture

There have been problems

in

reaching

definition of political culture and also difficulty in finding suitable

of political culture.

Sherbenou,

oja.

And even more troublesome

has been the

dilemma

cit .

ft

James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, ’’Public Regardingness as
a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, ” American Political Science Review 58
(December, 1964), 876-887; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City
,

1963); Lineberry and Fowler,
Ethos and the
"Political
op cit. Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field,
Structure of City Government, " American Political Science Review 60 (June,

Politics (Cambridge:
.

Harvard University Press,

;

,

Four Cities
1966), 306-326; and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian,
A Study in Comparative Policy-making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
:

Press, 1963).

31

of linking

what

considered as political culture

is

to political

behavior.

However,

Williams and Adrian have advanced a four-part typology on the proper role of
local government.

(1)

(3)

They defined

the legitimate scope of

"promoting economic growth;

(2)

providing and securing

maintaining traditional services and

interests.

59

,r

These roles

of

government

(4)

arbitrating

life's

among

as:

amenities;

conflicting

government are conditioned by and also a re-

flection of a particular kind of political culture.

Banfield and Wilson have shown that a public-regarding culture as

opposed

to a private -

a "middle -class ethos" in which the concern

a whole, not the neighborhood as
private -regarding culture.
the

most important variable

government.
culture to

69
60
that

it

is

60

is

for the

community as

implicit in the "immigrant ethos" of the

is

Therefore, for Banfield and Wilson, ethnicity was
in defining the

Lineberry and Fowler

become

civil service,

The public-regarding culture supposedly

and urban renewal.

city planning,

embody

regarding culture favors such policies as

expenditure pattern of local

felt that it is

possible for political

measures

institutionalized and affect taxation and expenditure

Williams and Adrian, o£.

cit .

However, Wolfinger and Field tested
"irrelevant in the South.

.

.

the "ethos theory" and found

fares badly in the Northeast.

.

.

inapplicable

and the Midwest provides the best evidence for the "ethos
theory, " but even there the differences between public-regarding and privateregarding cities are small and uneven, " ojo. cit.
to the West.

.

.

,
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in that

manner.

Once

characteristics, e.g.
in policy

outcomes. 61

political culture

becomes

institutionalized,

community

ethnicity, are less important than political
characteristics
It

clear that there

is

the role of political culture,

which

is

no definitive or final answer on

at best calls for further analysis.

Summary
The foregoing analysis
at last

points out the fact that political scientists have

discovered the urban scene as a genuine and

By moving

research.

into the

fruitful

area for systematic

area of policy outcomes, political scientists move

closer to answering Harold Lasswell's dictum about politics:

When and How" and we might add "Why.

"

"Who Gets What,

However, there are many other areas

of local politics which clamor for systematic analysis and explanation.

these areas

is

of

the subject of the present study - comparative municipal voter

turnout analysis.

This review reveals that substantial systematic comparative

analysis of municipal voter turnout has not been conducted.
earlier, the present study

is

As suggested

an attempt to partially alleviate this unfortunate

state of affairs.

61

One

Lineberry and Fowler, (New York: Knopf, 1955), 8-9.

,
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CHAPTER

II

MUNICIPAL VOTER TURNOUT DETERMINANTS:
REVIEW, CONCEPTS, HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY

Review

In a classic analysis of parties

political

tion have

and pressure groups

in the

American

system, V. O. Key observed that "most studies of electoral participa-

been microscopic; they focus on the individual and attempt

the characteristics or the motives that lead

him

to vote

to identify
1

or not to vote.

Key

further suggested that even though these studies are of great value, "they throw
little light

on the larger question of the relation between the extent and nature of

citizen participation and the character of the political system in the large. " 2

Although Key's challenge was directed towards encouraging scholars
in cross-national

analyses of electoral participation, there

is

to

engage

also an implicit

challenge for scholars to study comparatively electoral participation

in local

as

well as state and national elections in the United States.

IV. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.

Thomas

Y. Crowell Co„
2

Ibid.

1964),

591.

;

New York

,
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Cross-national and national analyses of electoral participation
are now
relatively plentiful. 3

But, as mentioned in Chapter

comparative studies of electoral participation
study dealing comparatively with participation

The primary aim

1,

there

is

a paucity of

at the local level with only one
in local elections. 4

of this study is to continue the research trend in

comparative analysis of voter participation

in local elections

as this participation

relates to the political and social structures of the community.

Lee and Alford

accurately point out that "although a number of important studies of politics and

3

Some works

in cross -national research are: Stein Rokkan, "CrossNational Studies in Political Participation, " International Social Science Journal,

12 (1960), 7-14; Stein Rokkan and Angus Campbell, "Citizen Participation in
Political Life: Norway and the United States of America, " ibid
69-99; Sidney
.

,

Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study,"
Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962), 22-42. Some national studies are: Angus Campbell,
The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Bernard Berelson,
Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1954); Eugene Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck (eds„), American Voting
Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1959); Warren Miller, "The Political
Behavior of the American Electorate, " American Government Annual 1960-61
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); and Angus Campbell, "Voters and
Elections: Past and Present, " Journal of Politics 26 (1964).
,

Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities, "
American Political Science Review 62 (September, 1968), 796. For a review
4

,

of the literature on local elections, see Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Ziegler,
Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1964).
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elections have

emerged

in

recent years, the data are far from sufficient to

permit more than the most speculative generalizations about the nature

of the

local electorate.

Comparative Municipal Election Literature

There have been a number of municipal election
concentrated on investigating elections on a small scale,

studies, but they

i.e.

,

studying a

certain aspect of elections in one, two or three cities on a comparative basis,

but

more

frequently a single election was studied. 6

5

6

Lee and Alford, 0 £.

Some

In the

area of comparative

cit.

Robert Alford and Harry Scoble,
Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), Chap. 4; Lawrence O'Rourke, Voting Behavior
in the Forty-Five Cities of Los Angeles County (Los Angeles: University of
California, Bureau of Governmental Research, 1953); G. W. Pearson,
"Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election, " Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (1948),
112-117; Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Non-Partisan Municipal
Elections, " Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (Spring, 1966), 79; James A.
Robinson and William H. Stanley, "Some Correlates of Voting Behavior: The
Case of Indiana, " Journal of Politics 22 (February, 1960), 96-111; Robert
Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan
Elections: The Case of DesMoines, " American Political Science Review 57
(September, 1963), 584-592; Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "Insulation
of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan Ballot, " American Political Science
Review, 53 (December, 1959), 1052-1063.
of these studies are:

,

,

,

,
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municipal elections on a large scale, there

is

a dearth of studies.

In an early

n

study

Eugene Lee did basically a

populations over 25,000.
tion, voting,

was then

statistical review of elections in 574 cities with

Data was obtained through questionnaires on registra-

nominating practices and turnover of elected

This data

officials.

classified by partisan and nonpartisan elections and by the three major

forms of municipal government.
Lee were twofold:

(1)

The basic purpose

to provide data

of the review according to

by which city elections can be compared

with elections at other governmental levels; and

(2)

to attempt, tentatively, to

assess the impact of various local governmental institutions upon the
With the compilation of

election process.

Lee

this pertinent, but

set the state for further research in this area.

undertaken

in this

city

fundamental data,

The analysis which

is

study conforms, in part, to Lee's second purpose.

In the second study,

Lee

in collaboration with

Robert Alford examined
O

comparatively, voter turnout

in

729 cities above 25,000 population.

This was

the first comprehensive study of municipal elections on a comparative basis.

The basic thesis

that the authors

examined was

that voter turnout is related to

the political and social structure of the local community.

7

Lee and Alford

Eugene Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile, " Municipal Year
Book (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1963), 95.
^Lee and Alford, o£.

cit,

796.
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9
concluded that "cities with
partisan elections, mayor-council

(or

non-manager)

government, high ethnicity, low education, low mobility, and eastern location,
tend to have a higher voting turnout than cities with nonpartisan elections,

council-manager government, low ethnicity, high education, high mobility and
far western location. "

But, they issued a warning to those

to accept this conclusion at face value.

They

who would be prone

said, "While relationships are

suggested between turnout, political and governmental structure, and characteristics of the population, these relationships

must be regarded more as leads

future research than as clear and unambiguous findings.

"-*-0

it

is partially

to

on the

basis of this statement that the findings of Lee and Alford are used as a foundation for the present study.

It

is the intention of this

and findings reached by Lee and Alford be subject

study that the conclusions

to further test.

Concepts
Political participation involves a multiplicity of factors.

the act of voting.

Participation by the electorate

may

discussion of public issues, financial contributions
in

It is

not simply

include such things as the

to political

causes, working

campaigns, influencing friends and acquiring information about candidates.

And

the extent to which these and other activities are engaged in by the electorate

9
10

Ibid.

,

809.

Ibid., 796.
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also

seems

to

depend on the differences

in the nature of the political

system.

Since the political system defines and channels the various political acts which
the electorate is allowed to perform, 11

it

is little

surprise, then, that partici-

pation by the electorate varies widely from one election to the next and from

one political system

to another.

Although political participation encompasses any one of a number of
factors, the

turnout.

major

political act utilized as the basis of this study is voter

"Voting turnout in local elections

is the

most direct measure of

participation in the electoral process and possibly an indication of other forms
l2
of political participation. "

factors and circumstances.

Voter turnout may be influenced by numerous
Variation in these factors

in the pattern of voter turnout in

any given election

in

may

result in variation

any given city.

instance, empirical evidence has supported the notion that turnout

is

For
higher in

national elections than in local elections and that "no contest" elections will

^For

discussion on municipal political systems, see Chapter III.

12

Lee and Alford,

0£. cit

.

,

797.

;
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result in low turnout.
different

from

Voter turnout

13
°

When

elections for local officials are held at a time

that for national or state officials, turnout will usually be low. 14
is

^

also influenced by the nature of the party system.

There are numerous other idiosyncratic factors associated with any
given election which

may

affect voter turnout rate.

Some

of these are the

perceived closeness of a contest by the electorate; the excitement brought on by

13

Roscoe Martin, "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study, "
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 14 (December, 1933), 193-237; Charles
H. Titus, "Voting in California Cities, 1900-1925, " Southwestern Political and
Social Science Quarterly 8 (March, 1928), 383-399; James K. Pollock, Voting
Behavior: A Case Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Bureau of
Government Research, (1939); Angus Campbell, et_aL_, The American Voter, op
Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959); Lester Milbraith,
Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.
1965); and Thomas Dye,
Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
1969), Chap. 9; Key, o£. cit. Lawrence O'Rourke, o£. cit
'

,

,

cit.

,

.

;

,
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Campbell, The American Voter Lane, Political Life Milbraith,
Political Participation Dye, Politics in States and Communities; Key, Politics
Parties and Pressure Groups
;

;

;

,

.

^Campbell, The American Voter Lester
;

Participation

in the States, " in

Milbraith, "Political

Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth Vines

(eds.),

Comparative State Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1965), Chap. 2;
Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled
(New York: John Wiley & Son, Inc., 1964); Lane, Political Life pp. 312-314;
,

,

Berelson, Voting Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Competitive Pressures
and Domestic Consent, " in Heinz Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz
(eds.), Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 275-286;
Scott,
and John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, III.
;

:

Foresman Co.,

1966).

,
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the campaign; the issues; and the personality of the candidates. 16

factors of primary

Two

other

significance also affecting voter turnout rate are the

demo-

graphic or socio-economic makeup of the community and the structural
characteristics of the government.

17

Admittedly, there are numerous ways of measuring turnout.
study, voter turnout is

measured on

electorate actually voting, i.e.
1

°

are persons who

meet

many cannot meet

the basis of the proportion of the potential

on the proportion of citizens twenty-one years

o

of age and over voting.
fail to

In this

Consequently, included in the potential electorate

For example,

the technical qualifications for voting.

the residence requirement, or

some have

lost the privilege

of voting through criminal conviction or of being confined in institutions.

However, the use of voter registration as a measure
be accompanied by problems.

mechanisms

For example, states have different laws and

for registration, which

state than another.

of turnout would similarly

make

registration

more

difficult in

one

Therefore, the number of persons registered and the percent

"

^ Angus

Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change,
Public Opinion Quarterly 24 (1960), 397-418; Campbell, The American Voter
Chap. 4; Alford and Scoble, Bureaucracy and Participation, op cit
,

.

17

Lee and Alford, 0£.

.

cit .

18 States with a lower age eligibility are not part of this study.

,
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of persons voting
of registration.

may

actually be, in part, a reflection of the ease or difficulty

^
Hypotheses

The basic hypothesis

of this study is that

form

of government, type of

electoral system and socio-economic characteristics influence voter turnout
rates

.

The forms

of

government used as

the basis for analysis in this study are

The commission form

the mayor-council and the council-manager.

of local

government has been omitted because there were too few commission
the

sample

prove of value

to

partisan and nonpartisan.
utilized, i.e.

,

in the analysis.

The

The types

of electoral

whether or not the party

affiliation of the candidate

characteristics are divided into three categories:

(2)

system are

legal definition for nonpartisan and partisan is

the ballot, not whether there exists any actual party activity.

mobility,

cities in

population homogeneity, and

(3)

(1)

appears on

The socio-economic

population growth and

social class.

Population growth

and mobility refer to percent population change 1950-60 and percent of migrants

19 Campbell, The

American Voter op cit. 276-282; Stanley Kelley, Jr.,
William
G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting
and
Richard Ayers,
374.
"
First Things First, American Political Science Review 61 (June, 1967),
,

.

,

,
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from

different county, respectively.

Population homogeneity refers to the

percent of non-whites, and ethnicity (proportion of foreign-born persons and
percent of persons of foreign and mixed parentage).

Social class refers to

occupation, education, homeownership, and income.

Subsidiary Hypotheses

A
ment

is

related subsidiary hypothesis of this study

related to socio-economic characteristics

9
.

is that

form

of

govern -

1

Because earlier studies

have found varied relationship existing between form of government and socio-

economic environment,

necessary to re-examine their findings as form of

it is

government and socio-economic characteristics are both hypothesized as being
related to voter turnout.

Consequently, a clearer understanding of the relation-

ship between voter turnout and form of government and socio-economic

characteristics should be provided.

20

For relevant material on participation of social class, see Edgar
Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public
Administration Review 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Robert Alford, "The Role
of Social Class in American Voting Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly 26
(March, 1963), 180-194; and Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of
Local Political Involvement, " American Sociological Review (December, 1968).
,

,

“^Derived from works of Kessel, op cit. Schnore and Alford, o£.
Alford and Scoble, ojd. cit, and Lee and Alford, ojd. cit.
.

;

;

cit.
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Thus, the following are subsidiary hypotheses
1.

2.

to

be investigated:

Manager governments are

likely to manifest a more rapid
population growth and population mobility than mayor council governments.

Manager governments more than mayor-council governments
are likely to have a higher percentage of college -educated
persons, a higher percentage of white-collar workers, a
lower percentage of persons earning $3,000 or less, a
higher percentage of persons earning $10,000 or more,
and a higher percentage of homeowners.

3.

Mayor-council governments are likely to be located in
communities with higher non-white and a higher ethnic
population than manager governments.

Basic Hypothesis
Subsequent

to the

analysis of the above subsidiary hypotheses, the

basic hypothesized relationship between voter turnout and form of government,
electoral system and socio-economic characteristics will be investigated.

The

specific propositions are:

1,

The mayor-council form

of government is

more

likely to

encourage and witness greater voter participation and
2"
turnout than manager governments.

22

Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1960); and Lee and Alford, 0£. cit.
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Voter turnout

2.

exist than

is likely to be greater where partisan elections
where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus,

nonpartisanship has the tendency to reduce voter turnout. 23

Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan
elections are combined with the mayor-council form of
government than where other combinations of electoral
24
systems and forms of government exist.

3.

Cities with rapid population growth and high mobility

4.

will experience low voter turnout.

Voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the percentage of well-educated (college) persons in the

5.

population increases.

Voter turnout

6.

is likely to

be higher

in

those cities with

a higher percentage of white-collar employees,

owners,

and a higher percentage of high

home-

income persons

than in cities with high percentages of opposite characteristics.

7.

Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high
percentage of non-white population.

8.

Voter turnout

be low in cities with high ethnic
foreign born and population of native-

is likely to

population (i.e.

,

mixed parentage).

23

2

Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship , op

^Lee and Alford, op

.

cit .

.

cit.
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Methodology
This study

is

an offshoot of a larger, more comprehensive study.

Although the present study

is

a study of voter turnout in

American

cities in the United States are not a part of this analysis.
cities in four states

York and Texas.
a large

number

was drawn.

cities, all

A random

These four states are California,

These particular states were chosen because:

sample

Illinois,

New

each has

(1)

of cities with over 100,000 population; and because

of

(2)

they

represent different regions of the country, i.e., the Far West, North Central,
Northeast and South, respectively.

This does not mean, necessarily, that each

state is "representative” of other states in that region.

The

cities range in population size

from 5,000

To

to 250,000.

facilitate

the collection of data they were categorized in population ranges of 5,000-10,000,

10,001-50,000, and 50,001-250,000.

sample of 75
be drawn,
cities

cities

was drawn.

all cities for that

came

to 558,

In

In

each of these categories a

cases where the

maximum sample

population size were utilized.

from which data

for cities

maximum

were able

to

The

total

could not

number

of

be included in the

actual study.

Howards, Professor of Government,
and Henry Brehm, Chief, Survey
(Amherst),
University of Massachusetts
Operations, Division of Disability Studies, Office of Research and Statistics,
Social Security Administration. This Health, Education and Welfare-sponsored
project was undertaken to investigate the relationship between demographic and

^Under

the direction of Irving

political variables and public policy outputs in

American

cities.

.
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It is

necessary

As there

to clarify a

number

of points concerning the data: 26

no national agency which collects voter turnout
information on American cities, questionnaires were sent
to each city in the study requesting voter turnout statistics. 27

1.

Response
2.

is

to questionnaires

was over 90 percent.

were requested to provide turnout figures from the
last two elections, between 1961 and 1968, in which either
the mayor or councilmen were elected. Where the mayor
was elected directly, total voter turnout for that office was
requested. Where the mayor was not elected directly, the
Cities

total

number

of council vacancies to be filled and the total

votes received by

all

councilmanic candidates were requested.

in some instances, concurrent
with state elections, but not with national elections.

3.

The voter turnout data are,

4

The data provide no indication of the nature of the office
of mayor or manager in each city in reference to power

.

and the exercise of power.
5.

Data on political structures, e,g., form of government
and electoral system, were obtained from the International
City Manager's Association Municipal Year Book 1965.
Therefore, it is possible that some cities may not have
had the same political structures in 1965 as they had when
the elections were held. However, this shouldn't affect
,

the pattern of correlations.

6.

government refers to manager, mayor-council or
commission governments. Partisan and nonpartisan are
legal definitions used to refer to those electoral systems

Form

in

of

which party labels are permitted or not permitted on

the

ballot, respectively.

26 All data utilized in this study are part of the

Howards-Brehm

project.

Questionnaires used by Howards and Brehm are in the appendix.
each
There was over 90 percent return on questionnaires from the cities in
27 Ibid.

state
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7.

Data on the social structure, e.g., occupation, education,

were obtained from the 1960 United States Census of
Population
Because the adult population for 1960 is used
.

and election figures are for 1961-68, changes in population
are not reflected. But it is hoped that the results obtained
can be useful and suggestive.

,
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CHAPTER

III

AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

Introduction

This chapter will provide a brief historical view of urban

political

structures, pointing out the effect certain factors have had upon existing

structures and how new structures were devised to meet new needs and wants;
indicating the

power relationships which developed with

the

new types

of

structures in the population; emphasizing the basic feature of each structure;

and pointing up the impact that each structure has had upon urban

politics.

In

addition, the chapter will explore the significance of electoral systems, i.e.

nonpartisanship and partisan elections, as well as examine the possible linkage

between socio-economic characteristics and mayor-council and manager forms
of local

government through a review

of

some

of the literature.

The ultimate

point of the chapter is to provide a clear focus and basis from which

it

will be

possible in the following chapter to attempt to link the ’'principles” or theories
of

governmental structures and socio-economic characteristics through the

existing empirical data.
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Political Structures

Forms

of Local

Government

The nature

of political structures apparently has

some

effect upon the

extent to which the electorate participates in various political activities.
Political structures define, identify, channel and restrict the sundry political

acts which the electorate

is

permitted

to

perform.

Not only do political structures

guide participation, they also affect governmental performance
policy output areas.

1

must be readily admitted

’It

cities

can be attributed to one factor

Robert Salisbury

in his

various

that there is a close and

direct relationship between the form of government and

Richard G. Childs observed "that differences

in

its

in political

performances.

performance

in

3
- structure. "

study of

St.

Louis politics found that the structure

of local government tends to shape the goals, tactics, and behavior of local
parties, interest groups, and the political environment in which they

Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities, " Journal of
Politics 29 (February, 1967), 94-108; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation
Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables, "
American Political Science Review 60 (March, 1966), 73-82; Robert Lineberry
"
and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities,
American Political Science Review 61 (September, 1967), 706; and Charles
Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 198.
,

,

,

2

George

S.

Blair,

American Local Government (New York: Harper and

Row, 1964), 205.
^Civic Victories (New York:

Harper and Row, 1952),

57.

"
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"Form and

function.

among

structure distribute advantages and disadvantages

the participants, authorizing and denying, giving formal
opportunities to

control areas of policy to

some and denying them

The structural components

of

to

others. 5

government are instruments designed

primarily for facilitating the attainment of certain objectives.

Among

these

objectives are the provision of services and goods to the people and providing

When

for the overall welfare of the people.
fails to

a particular form of government

adequately meet the needs and wants of the people, circumstances

dictate that

it

be instituted.

be modified or changed and that a different governmental form
Historically, as the United States

ment underwent alteration or modification
of increased responsibilities.

ment had certain
of

the

people subsequently changed, the structures of urban govern-

life style of the

framework

became urbanized and

in

an effort to meet the challenges

Each modification

political implications for

government and among

in the structure of

power distribution

the various

segments

govern-

in the internal

of the population.

Although such modifications cannot be considered as definite determining
factors in urban political relationships, they must be given their just weight

as conditioning factors.

4

Robert Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationship Among Interests,
Parties, and Governmental Structure, " Western Political Quarterly 13 (June
1960), 498-507.
,

5

Duane Lockard, The Politics
Macmillan Co. 1963), 326.
,

of State

and Local Government (New York
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When

the United States gained its independence in
1776, only three

percent of the population lived
percent of population

in

in

urban or non-rural communities.^ The

incorporated areas was even less.

Urban

political

structures were modeled after the type of system with which the colonists
had

been familiar

in

England

- the

mayor-council government.

specific pattern which this type of government
to another as

much

as

it

does today.

that of presiding

over the council.

was the universal form prior
There emerged

in the

very much the existing urban

6

Ibid.

,

assumed varied from one

But, basically the

power and practically no executive power.

However, the

mayor had no

city

veto

The mayor's primary function was

The mayor-council form

of

government

to the twentieth century.

early nineteenth century, a philosophy affecting
political structures.

This was the philosophy of

71.

7

For early development of the mayor-council government, see John A.
Municipal Administration (New York: MacMillan Company, 1901),
Chapters 5 and 19; Frank J. Goodnow, City Government in the United States
(New York: The Century Company, 1904), Chapters 3 and 8; Ernest S.
Griffith, History of American City Government (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1938); William B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration I
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1930), Chapter 19; William B. Munro, The
Government of American Cities 3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1920),
Fairlie,

,

,

Chapter

1.
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Jacksonian Democracy.

The principles

government by the common man and
office as no special qualifications

development

of Jacksonian

the belief that any

were needed.

of the idea of universal white

accompanied by the view

Democracy were

man

could hold public

This notion led to the

manhood

suffrage.

These ideas were

that public office-holders, as servants of the people,

should be elected, not appointed.

Inevitably, a proliferation of elective offices

plan"*
occurred.

This practice eventually resulted

already weak powers of the mayor.

middle of the 19th century what

the

is

in

a further weakening of the

Consequently, there developed by the

known as

the

"weak-mayor

*

where

mayor was hamstrung by Jacksonian democracy and Madisonian checks

and balances.

"The structural form of

that officeholders should be

many

in

this pattern still reflects the ideology

number, have few powers, and

should be checks upon their exercise of these powers.

that there

"9

Q

Arthur Bromage, Introduction to Municipal Government and Admini stration (N ew York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), 14-15; Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1945);
Jewel Cass Phillips, Municipal Government and Administration (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1960), 19; Adrian, _op. _cit. 73.
,

*The characteristic features

of the

weak-mayor plan

are:

(1)

a council

which exercises both legislative and executive powers; (2) a mayor with no
control over administration; (3) a small council; and (4) an array of boards and
commissions which are independent of each other. Basically, the mayor is
weak because he lacks administrative power and he is also restricted by the
These four points were taken
council. This situation leads to immobilisme
.

from Blair,

o£. cit

J

Ibid.

.

,

206.

,
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With the municipal executive immobilized between the Scylla

of

Jacksonian Democracy and the Charybdis of Madisonian checks and balances
a period

when

the

in

requirements of governmental action were increasing

geometrically, the avenue was paved for another organization

necessary (unctions of the

city.

to

perform

the

Robert Merton observed that whenever formal

institutions fail to discharge their functions, informal institutions developed to

perform them.

^

The informal organization which developed was

machine with a boss as

its

^

leader.

1

Political

the political

machines were able through

informal methods to satisfy those needs which the formal governmental structure

was prevented from doing.

Sait

observed

that,

"when the people or particular

groups among them demanded positive action, no one had adequate authority
to act.

The machine provided an

12
antidote. "

10

Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe,
Free Press, 1957), 72-82.

^For

111.

:

depth discussion of the machine and its operation see, "City
Bosses and Political Machines," The Annals (May, 1964); F. R. Kent, The
Great Game of Politics, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1923); W. L.

an

in

Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.
1905); Lincoln Steffens, The Same of the Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips
and Co., 1904); and Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States (Durham,
N. C. Duke University Press, 1930).
,

:

12

Edward M.

Sait,

"Machine, Political,

Sciences, 9 (Chicago, 1908), 658.

"

Encyclopedia of the Social
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Although political bosses and machines have been widely
crucified, the fact remains that they did
in their day.

According

to

to

in

whom

order

to

and

perform necessary social functions

Merton, the machine humanized and personalized

social welfare; afforded businesses, including

needed

vilified

illicit

ones, privileges that they

survive; provided an avenue of social mobility for persons

other avenues were closed; and was the panacea to the constitutional

dispersal of power.
suffrage.

It

13

The machine made extraordinary use

of universal

increased electoral participation through seeing that every eligible

male was registered and
services for which

it

that he voted on election day.

expected

in

The machines performed

return the vote of the recipient on election

day.

The excesses

of the political

machine led

Richard Hofstadter called an Age of Reform.

14

to its

demise and

to

what

Municipal government had

severely declined in prestige as a result of alleged corruption, inefficiency,

extravagance and ineptitude.

For these and many other

and the machine were indicted.
in

"evils, " the city boss

Motivated by the corruption and mismanagement

government, well meaning but inexperienced reformers

13

Merton,

^jp.

cit.

Also see Adrian,

"^Vintage Books, (New York, 1955).

ojd.

cit.

,

,r

began their efforts

147-150.
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to

reclaim city government from the boss and the

as the 1870's. "

15

The

ills of city

political

machine as early

government were diagnosed by

reformers

the

as a natural result of a structure of government which recruited
those persons

who were susceptible

to corruption.

The reformers argued

that the

governmental

structure which existed in the cities were those designed for a rural setting with
its

intimate relationship and that for a complex urban environment, the old

political structures

were an anachronism,

effectively deal with the

monumental and

that such structures did not

difficult tasks

accompanying urbani-

zation, and that consequently a political boss could easily capture city govern-

ment and bring minimum order
In

to

of the existing administrative chaos.

an effort to "return government

to the

people" and make

them, a national movement of municipal reform was founded.

it

accountable

With the

founding of the National Municipal League in 1894, the movement was coordinated

under that organization.

This was a movement spearheaded by the aroused

middle-class whose primary goals were eliminating corruption, increasing
efficiency, bringing

local

some measure

government more democratic.

of

economy

,

79.

government and making

The reformers were guided by a middle-

class ethos or ideology "which sees politics as a

15 Adrian, op. cit.

to local

means

of moralizing life and

,
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which attaches great importance to the individuals’ obligation
public. "

16

The reformers conceptualized their program

electorate in the position to assert

(2)

its will

to 'serve' the

as:

(1)

despite professional politicians;

simplifying the voters' tasks, improving his information and exhorting him

to his civic duty;

(3)

checking the tide of immigration; and

(4)

separating the

"business" of city government from state and national politics;
the

putting the

power of neighborhoods and other
17

partial interests; and

The reformers assumed

the executive.

(6)

(5)

weakening

strengthening

that the structures of

government could

be so manipulated that "good people" would control the government.
believed that reformed structures would allow government
corporation, e.g.
efficiency.

improve

run like a

on the basis of scientific management and administrative

Reform was manifested

two basic ways:

in

to 'throw the rascals out' and to put honest

to

to

They

men

in office

government and

the structure of municipal

(1)

"through efforts

and

(2)

through efforts

increase administrative

to

efficiency.

But, the reformers belatedly realized that even

men

as

mayors and councilmen, these

l6

Edward

C. Banfield and

officials

James

were

if

still

they did elect "good"

hamstrung by the

Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York:

Vintage Books, 1963), 139.
17

1

ment

8

Ibid.

,

140-141.

Harold A. Stone, Don Price and Kathryn Stone, City Manager Govern-

in the

United States, (Chicago:

Public Administration Service, 1940), 3.
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existing systems of government.

The leaders

of the

reform movement were

subsequently aware of the fact that the structures of local government could

prevent political and administrative reforms and they therefore attempted to
devise a form not amenable to control by party.
In

response

to the

ment which was capable

of

demand

19

A

modern type

in the first

version of this plan was first put into effect

For the

government

- a

govern-

reform, the strong-mayor-council

The mayor was invested with the sole power
heads.

of

meeting the exigencies of a complex urban environ-

ment, the reformers proposed,
plan.

for a

first time, there

to appoint

in

Brooklyn

in 1880.

and dismiss department

was an integrated administrative structure.

Virtually complete control for administrative responsibility was in the hands
of the mayor.

The mayor shared policy-making with

more, he was completely responsible for

19

in

New York

Further-

his budget.

The strong-mayor plan was so successful
was adopted

the council.

in

Brooklyn that

it

subsequently

City, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, and San

Technically, this form

is

not considered a reformed structure.

But,

weak -mayor plan, it is inserted
because it was
For discussion of reformed and unreformed structures see Robert
at this point.
Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, ’'Reformism and Public Policies in American
an effective alternative to the old

Cities, ”

American

Political Science

Review

,

61 (September, 1967), 706.
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Francisco.

The reformers considered

pragmatic and organized approach

was conducive

plan

problems

of urbanization.

This plan

neighborhood

interests

voted for a mayor who shared their policy preferences.

The mayor was quite aware of

mayor

to the

strong-mayor plan a much more

to the satisfaction of the particular ethnic,

in the city for voters

accordingly.

the

this quid

pro quo relationship and governed

With the diversity of interests represented

seemed most amenable

in the city the

strong-

to their articulation and satisfaction.

However, the strong-mayor form of government had many weaknesses.
Although the mayor had the authority to utilize sound principles and techniques
of

management and

to appoint and

remove subordinates without interference,

he was somewhat circumscribed by obligations he had incurred during his
election.

form

Debts to individuals, parties and various groups were paid

in the

of appointments and other favors which severely limited the performance

level of the government.

Furthermore, the electorate very often elected an

amateur rather than professional administrator.
failed to effect a separation

between

politics

Lastly, the strong-mayor plan

and administration which was

thought to be necessary for an efficient, economical, and impartial administration.

However, the strong-mayor plan presently predominates

in large

urban and

metropolitan areas.

The notion

of

improving municipal government through the

business techniques and principles was more closely applied

utilization of

in the

development
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of the

commission plan

in the first

decade of the twentieth century.

commission plan grew out of an unusual circumstance
Texas.

In

September, 1900, a hurricane

process of rebuilding the
legislature.

city, local

This was done because

all but

government was suspended by
it

Galveston,

destroyed the city and

was necessary

tape of dealing with the local councilmanic body of

Munro observed

in the city of

The

to

in the

the state

dispense with the red

fifty -four

members. William

that "while the city lay prostrate its elective officers fell to

wrangling among themselves over the awarding of contracts for clearing away
the ruins. "

20
Substituted in place of the mayor-council government was a

temporary government

of five local

businessmen

- the

Galveston Commission.

This commission stabilized the situation and got the city on
in a

new charter, an

effort

was made

had been extremely effective.
of five

people.

members

-

to retain the

The charter called

its feet.

In 1903

commission system since
for a

21

it

commission composed

three appointed by the governor and two elected by the

This procedure was ruled unconstitutional by the court, but the

legislature subsequently authorized that all commissioners be elective.

20

William B. Munro, City Government by Commission (New York: D.
Appleton and Co. 1914), 13-14.
,

91

For detailed information on the commission see Munro, Ibid and T.
Chang, History and Analysis of the Commission Municipal Government in the
,

United States (Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1918).

S.
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Consequently, the commission form of government was
launched as a new
type of governmental structure to deal with the problem of
urbanization.

Because of

tremendous success of the commission plan

the

other cities were soon attracted to

it.

plan.

But, not only did other

Texas adopt the commission structure of government,

parts of the country adopted

it.

In

Galveston,

Houston, which faced a financial crisis

because of mismanagement quickly adopted the
cities in

in

cities in other

Des Moines such reform devices as non-

partisan elections, referendum, initiative and recall were added.

By

1910,

108 cities had gravitated towards the commission system and the number

increased to 500 by 1917.

However, following 1917, a dramatic
reformers

lost interest in the

shift took place as

commission form

government and

of

This decline might be accounted for,

subsequently declined.

creation of the council-manager system of government
popularity.

Many

cities

municipal

in

its

in part,

1914 and

its

use

by the
subsequent

which abandoned the commission plan switched

to the

22

council-manager plan.

The following
government between

table provides a brief picture of the decline of the
the years 1941-1968.

22
""

281

.

commission

Adrian, o£.

cit.

,

218; Phillips, op. jnt.

,

297-298; Bromage, o£.

cit.

,

1

61

TABLE
COMMISSION GOVERNMENT

I

IN CITIES

OVER

5,000

POPULATION

SINCE 1940

Year

Total No.

Total No. of

Comm.

of Cities

1941
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1968

SOURCE:

2,033
2,033
2,033
2,527
2,562
3,051
2,985

Percent

Cities

332

16.3

327

16.1
14.9

302

356
309
237

14.

12.0

7.9

190

6.4

Municipal Year Book (Chicago:

Managers

International City

Association, 1943-68).

There has been a steady decrease
the

commission system

of

government.

in the

percentage of cities which have

Between the years 1941-1968,

the per-

centage decline was nearly 10 percent.

The main advantages
that

commission system were considered

of the

government could be simple,

for all

power was concentrated

in

to be

a few

hands; that with the short ballot voters elect only a few officials, which would
allow greater control by the citizen,

more democracy, and permit

the voters

government; that
to elect better qualified candidates which would result in better

government could be run as a corporation

for the

commission resembled a

62

corporate business organization; that the elimination of separation
of powers

and checks and balances would be conducive

to the

government responding

expeditiously to the people's demands for governmental service; that leadingcitizens would be willing to serve as commissioners, thus elevating the standard

for officeholders and providing bettern government; and that commissioners

would be elected on a non-partisan

ballot. “

These professed advantages more

than anything else struck a death knell for political machines in municipal
politics, for

ward elections and party

labels would be abolished.

However, many of the features which were worshipped as
strong points turned out

government

to

be

its

failed to provide a

most glaring weaknesses.

it

commission's

The commission

brake on government spending.

commissioners who appropriated money spent

the

The same

as heads of departments.

Commissioners were often inadequately equipped as administrators.

There was

no provision for an organizational distinction between the policy-making

There was no single person responsible

function.

lastly, the

commission plan was "so conducive

voter needs to

make

to

for executive leadership.

buck-passing that although the

only five choices at the polls, he

23

Adrian, o£.

cit.

;

(did) not

know whom

to

Government by
in the United States
Government
Municipal
Reed,

Blair, o£. cit.; Munro, City

Commission, _op. cit. Thomas
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company,
;

And

1934);

Bromage,

0£.

_cit.

"
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blame

for

bad government or

to praise for

good government.

” 24

Nevertheless, the commission system was an astonishingly
radical

departure

.

from

the prevailing

forms

The main feature which distinguished
the complete

abandonment

of

government

at the turn of the century.

from traditional municipal

it

of separation of powers.

politics

was

But, as Adrian observed in

discussing the plan, "outmoded structures of government live beyond the time

when they are needed, as do

all

human

being organized on a formal basis.
structure of government.

institutions

There

which suffer the rigidity

of

no future for the commission

is

Those commission

cities that

remain do so as a

result of apathy or because office-holders have a vested interest in the status

25
quo.

The council-manager form

of

government was devised

deficiencies of the commission system.

to

Although, the commissioners could

very easily determine policy, they often lacked the competence
daily

complex problems

of administration.

not only as a replacement for the
difficulties

24

to direct the

The council-manager plan was seen

commission

plan, but as a

remedy

experienced by other forms of municipal government.

"Forms of Municipal

meet the

for the

3

Government (New York: National Municipal League,

1939), 4.

^Adrian,

_op. eft.

,

218.

2^

Story of the Council-Manager Plan (New York: National Municipal
League, 1940), 12; Ibid. Forms of Municipal Government (New York: National
,

Municipal League, 1959),

12.

64

The exact origin
dispute.

of the

council-manager system

is

a matter of

Both Staunton, Virginia and Sumter, South Carolina claim

first city to institute the

government

to

replace

council-manager form.

its

In deciding on a

to

some
be the

new form

of

weak-mayor, bicameral council system, Staunton

in

1908 chose the general manager type.

However, Richard

S.

Childs,

who

at that

time was secretary of the

National Short Ballot Organization, was mainly responsible for the development

and popularizing of the council-manager plan.

Childs blamed politicians and

the governmental structure for municipal corruption and he believed "that by

tinkering with the mechanics of government

boss and the machine and returned
"city

manager

its

control could be taken from the

to the people. "

27
It

has been said that the

plan was the result of the combination of two experiments, the

commission plan and

the Staunton plan.

performed the ceremony

Richard Childs was the minister who

" 28
that united the two.

This ceremony occurred in 1911

Lockport,

in

New York when

Childs

drafted a city charter combining provisions for a city-manager with provisions
for a

commission government.

However,

this

27

of Its

model charter was rejected by

the

John East Porter, Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought
Founder, Richard S. Childs (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

Press, 1965), 21.
28
Stone, Price and Stone, op.

cit.

,

9.
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state legislature, but

charters."

29

"became

it

model for

Therefore, Sumter, South Carolina

effect the first genuine

of

the basic

put

manager

credited with putting into

council-manager plan the following year.

government received

when Dayton, Ohio

is

all future

its

greatest impetus and greatest publicity in 1914

The council-manager system was

into operation.

it

This new form

firmly endorsed by the National Municipal League and with this endorsement,
the national

movement

The use

to gain

council-manager form of government by municipalities

of the

until today it is

increased progressively
5,000 population and

acceptance for the plan was underway.

in

more

used by 43 percent

of cities with

than 50 percent of cities with

over

populations

30

between 25,000 and 250,000.

The following two
council-manager plan

tables provide information on the growth of the

in all cities

between 1915 and 1960 and

the

growth of the

plan in cities with over 5,000 population between 1941-1968.

99J

Reed,

cit.

,

205.

^ Municipal Year Book
Association, 1968), 54.

(Chicago:

International City Manager's

66

TABLE

II

GROWTH OF THE COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN 31

NUMBER

YEAR

49

1915
1920

158

1925

297

1930

388
451

1935
1940

506
590
900

1945
1950
1955
1960

1,

170

1,682

Information acquired from Municipal Year Book (Chicago:
International City Managers Association, 1941-1968).

SOURCE:

3l
13.

Adrian, o£.

cit.

,

220; Story of the Council-Manager Plan

,

jop.

cit..
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TABLE

COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN

YEAR

III

IN CITIES

OVER

5,000

Total No. of

Total No. of

Cities

Council-Manager

POPULATION

Percent

Cities

1941
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1968

2,033
2,033
2,033
2,527
2,562
3,051
2,985

315
350
495
764
931
1,202
1,283

15.5

17.3

24.3
30.3
38.0
40.0
43.0

Information acquired from Municipal Year Book (Chicago:
International City Managers Association, 1941-1968).

SOURCE:
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The two strongest advantages claimed
government were

that:

(1)

for the council-manager

form of

there is complete concentration of administrative

authority and responsibility in the hands of the manager; and

(2)

there

a

is

separation of politics or legislation from administration for the legislative
function

is

exercised by the council and the administrative function

hands of the manager.

Other advantages claimed were

powers or checks and balanced;
(3)

(2)

(1)

is in

the

no separation of

professionalization of administration; and

a structure of government which can be easily understood by the people,

thereby facilitating accountability from elected representatives.

Harold Stone and similarly-minded colleagues have suggested

that the

general purpose of the leading advocates of the council-manager plan was
"have the city government devote

work done

for the

its

energies more effectively toward getting

community and toward wasting

incidental or factional purposes."

33

32

To achieve

First, the idea that the

three political ideas.

to

less of

its

this, the

money and

effort on

advocates proposed

most capable and

public spirited

citizens should serve on the governing body as representatives of the city at
large, to determine policies for the benefit of the

than for a party, faction or neighborhood.

32

community as a whole rather

This idea was embodied in the non-

"The Theory of Government, "
Urban Government (New York: Free Press, 1969), 322.
Stone, et. al.

,

in

Edward

C. Banfield,

,

69

partisan ballot and in the system of election at large of
a small council.

Second,

the idea that municipal administration should be
delegated to a thoroughly

competent, trained executive, who should get and hold his job on
his executive
ability alone.

authority

This idea was embodied

in the city

manager.

in the

concentration of administrative

Third, the idea that voters should hold only the

councilmen politically responsible and should give the

permanence and neutrality

controversy.

in political

city

manager a

status of

This idea was embodied

in

the unification of powers in the council as a body comprising the only elected
officials in the city

government.

Reformers have accorded

the

council-manager plan an inordinate amount

of praise, but the plan has also been subject to criticism.
that various groups, e.g.

The

critics argued

racial and geographical interests, ought to be

represented on the council since a small council consisting largely of renown

community leaders was unrepresentative, ergo undemocratic.
argued that the undemocratic nature

manager was non-elective,

of the plan

thus resulting in the

was reflected

the council, did not pacify the critics.

system was

that there

was no

to a

in the fact that the

manager being irresponsive

the will of the public and hence beyond public control.

was appointed by and was accountable

Critics also

The

fact that the

to

manager

body elected by the people, namely

Another objection

to the

political leadership - a basic

council-manager

requirement

in the

70

OA

policy formulation.

manager

cities,

It

was.

would be the

assumed

that the

mayor, usually a figurehead

political leader while the

in

manager concentrated

on administrative matters, but experience has proven otherwise. 35
There were
other objections to the council-manager system, but the undemocrat.ic and
lack
of political leadership

From

the standpoint of honesty, impartiality, and efficiency, the council-

manager form
exceptions. °

arguments were probably the two most common ones.

of

government seems

to

However, advocates of

politics could be separated

be a qualified success, save for a few
the

system erroneously assumed

from administration.

In

that

reviewing what happened

in

Dayton, Childs observed, "politics blew out of the window when Dayton's first
city

manager blew

between
if

in. "

37

But, no clear and sharp distinction can be

politics and administration for one blends into the other.

politics is the "allocation of scarce resources" and the

this allocation, he is ipso facto engaging in politics.

made

Furthermore,

manager administers

Karl Bosworth stated that

34

On problems of political leadership in manager cities see Charles R.
Adrian, "Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities: A Study of Three
Communities," Public Administration Review 18 (Summer, 1958), 208-222.
,

35

Clyde Snider, American State and Local Government (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), 406-407.
36
37

Edward

James Q. Wilson,

C. Banfield and

Childs, Civic Victories

,

op

.

cit.

,

148.

City Politics

,

o£. cit.,

185.
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"council -manager government, by placing the manager
directly in public view,

accentuates public interest

He went on

leader. "

them as

to

how

in

bureaucrat operates as a political

say that "where managers are used,

let

us think of

officers of general administrative direction and political leadership, for

what they are.

that is

"The council-manager

human
using

this kind of

institutions.

it

that,

In

It

.

.

however so

suffers from

some weaknesses

as do all

satisfied the bulk of voters in cities

once adopted abandonments are rare."

summary

which exist

has,

plan.

there are three principal forms of municipal government

in the United States at present;

and commission.

mayor-council, council-manager

Table IV gives the distribution of forms of government by

population categories.

Of the 2,985

cities reporting, 50.6 percent have

mayor-council

government, 6.4 percent have commission government and 43.0 percent have
the council-manager form.
in the large

Mayor-council governments are quite prevalent

and small population categories, while council-manager governments

are popular in the middle-sized cities.

^8

(Summer,

"The Manager

is

a Politician,"

Public Administration Review, 18

1958), 216-222.

^Adrian, Governing Urban America

,

op

.

cit.

,

228.
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Electoral Systems

Nonpartisanship

One significant

political change

government was nonpartisan elections.
partisan elections refer to elections
the ballot.)

in

accompanying

Where

manager

plan of

40
(As indicated in Chapter 2, non-

which party labels are not printed on

Nonpartisan elections are used

over 5,000 population.

the

in

64.9 percent of the cities with

the nonpartisan ballot is used,

it

is

most

often

connected with commission or council-manager governments and with the atlarge system of representation.

The nonpartisan ballot

of cities over 5,000 population with

is

found in 82.3 percent

manager governments, 49.2 percent

of

41

mayor-council

cities

and 69.5 percent of commission

Nonpartisan-

cities.

ship spread also to judicial offices and even to two state legislatures

Minnesota and Nebraska.

However,

it is

most widely used on

-

the local level

for city elections.

40

The development of the nonpartisan ballot actually began before the
municipal reform movement. For a detailed history of this development see
Eugene Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship Berkeley: University of Califronia
(

Press, 1960).
4

Municipal Year Book (Chicago:

Association, 1968).

International City

Managers

74

Tables

V and

VI provide an indication on the use of nonpartisanship

in

certain population categories and by the various types of government.

The nonpartisan

ballot

was adopted by reformers as a means

divorcing local politics from state and national issues.

government was primarily a matter

that city

and therefore had nothing in

common

be more businessmen than politicians.

means

to recruit the

Reformers had argued

of efficiency and "good business"

with state and national politics.

government was a "business operation,

effective

of

"

it

If

local

followed that local officials should

Therefore, nonpartisanship was an

"good people" of the

those in the

city, i.e.,

upper and middle class, who would not ordinarily associate themselves with
local

government because of partisan wranglings.

the boss

were denied

the boss

system would disappear.

his

'It

chance to use the party ticket

Thus

it

was.

.

.

assumed

to elect his

was proposed

that

if

crew, then

that city elections be

held without benefit of party labels so that honest citizens would have a chance
to

win office without having
42

machine.

"

to

win the favor of the minions of the party

Childs observed that with nonpartisan elections combined with

the short ballot, the "voter can accumulate and carry in his head his brief list
of personal preferences and do without guidance of party

42

Lockard,

ojd.

ctt.

,

226-227.

names and symbols on

1

11

75

TABLE V
NONPARTISANSHIP

Population Category

IN CITIES

SOURCE:

5,000

Percent
Partisan

24
25

41.7
24.0

90

41.

Percent
Nonpartisan

208
427
1,057
1,049

31.7
33.3
34.4

58.3
76.0
58.9
68.3
66.7
65.6

36. 9

63.

2,880

35.

64.9

Municipal Year Book (Chicago:

Managers Association,

POPULATION

No. of Cities
Reporting

Over

500,000
250,000-500,000
100,000-250,000
50,000-100,000
25,000- 50,000
10,000- 25,000
5,000- 10,000
All cities over
5,000

OVER

1S68).

International City

76

TABLE VI
NONPARTISANSHIP AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Form

of

Government

Mayor-Council
Council-Manager

Commission

Town Meeting

No. of Cities
Reporting

Percent
Nonpartisan

1,387

50.8;

1,229
174
62

17.7

30.5
43.5

49.2
82.3
69.5
56.5

28

39.3

60.7

Representative
Town Meeting

SOURCE: Municipal Year Book
Managers Association,

Percent
Partisan

1968).

(Chicago:

International City

77

43
the ballot or voting machine. "

Thus, the voter would be able to make a

'

rational, better -informed choice of candidates.

Empirical evidence has failed

which endeared the reformers

to

where nonpartisanship existed,

to support

many

of these assumptions

Charles Adrian found that

nonpartisanship.

the following patterns of elections

may be

44
"elections where the only candidates

found:

who normally have any chance

of

being elected are those supported directly by a major political party organiza45

where slates

"elections

tion";

of candidates are

including political party organization";

46

supported by various groups,

"elections where slates of candidates

are supported by various interest groups, but political party organizations have
47
little

or no part

in

campaign, or are active only sporadically";

National Municipal League

,

and "elections

"500 Non-Political Elections,

"

(1948),

172.

44

"A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections,

"

Western Political Quarterly

,

12 (June, 1959), 449-458.

45

Voters in Boston, Chicago and Detroit are well aware of the candidates’
Therefore, candidates feel free to accept the support of their party.

party.

46

For an account

A

Election:

of this

Political Illusion ?

phenomenon see Marvin Harder, Nonpartisan
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1958).
,

4 17

See J. Lieper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Consider282ations and "A Case Analysis, " American Journal of Sociology 64 (1958),
"
Public Opinion
289; G. W. Pearson, "Prediction in a Nonpartisan Election,
Black, "Class
Gordon
Quarterly 12 (Spring, 1948), 115; Robert Salisbury and
"
and Party in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines,
Science Review, LVI I (September, 1963), 584-592; and Lee,
,

,

American
op

.

cit .

Political

78

where neither
campaigns.

"

political parties nor slates of candidates are important in

This latter situation results

of acquaintance. "

in

what Eugene Lee calls "politics

Candidates will attempt to fashion an organization comprised

of friends, neighbors, relatives, business associates and professional

colleagues.

Although nonpartisanship has presumably weakened political parties,
it

has created a situation in which special interest groups and other loyalties

influence local government.

Gerald Pomper found

elections changed the lines of electoral cleavage.

based on party loyalties, ethnic

Pomper

in

Newark

that

nonpartisan

48
Instead of cleavage being

affiliation of voters

were most

influential.

stated that "the goal of its advocates - to emancipate municipal

elections from 'tyranny of the national and state political parties' -has been

On

fulfilled.

the other hand, nonpartisanship has not succeeded in creating a

model electorate, one which makes

its

decision free of any group influences.

displacement of party ties may simply result

In fact the

other influences. "

Morlan bluntly stated

government by pressure groups

48

in the substitution of

that "nonpartisanship results in

- labor unions,

business associates, etc. -

Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections,
Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (Spring, 1966), 79.
,

49
Ibid.

,

95.

"

79

rather than parties at the city level."

50

Advocates of nonpartisanship also naively assumed that with parties
divorced from local politics, local voting could be based upon local issues.
But, the fact is that discussion of local issues have been avoided in campaigns.
Instead, candidates have spoken only in vague generalities and the personalities
of candidates have

become

of great importance.

Because candidates must

appeal to the whole electorate, they steer clear of controversial matters, ergo

important issues.

Some

investigators doubt the separation of partisan politics from local

51
voting

with the use of nonpartisan elections.

study of nonpartisan elections

who voted

in local

in

Williams and Adrian,

in their

four Michigan cities, discovered that voters

nonpartisan election for slates of candidates were also very

likely to vote for partisan candidates on the state level.

They also found

that

minority party candidates had a better chance of winning against the majority
party candidate in nonpartisan elections than

in

Also, in

partisan elections.

nonpartisan cities where Democrats predominate, persons who vote Republican

Robert Morlan, "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis, " National
Municipal Review (now National Civic Review ), (November, 1949), 485-490.
51

Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics
Under the Nonpartisan Ballot, " American Political Science Review 53 (December
1959), 1052-63; Salisbury and Black, o£. cit. Charles E. Gilbert, "Some
u
Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities, Midwest Journal of Politics
,

;

,

6 (1962), 345-62.

80

regularly would gain an "increased voice in local affairs. " Gilbert's findings

support the latter point of view, at least

covered

in large cities.

He similarly dis-

that nonpartisan elections favored the Republicans and the conservative

forces, as a whole, in city politics.

Salisbury and Black concluded that

despite the nonpartisan format of local elections.

.

.

and despite a relative

absence of overt electioneering by party organization or partisan identification
of candidates, cleavages are manifested in local

resemblance
It is

achieved.
if

'better'

to partisan

cleavages

highly doubtful that the

Exactly what

is

in the

community.

aim of

meant by

campaigns which bear a close
52

'better' candidates have

been

never been clarified.

'better' has

means more representative,

"

However,

clearly experience has not proven this

to be the case. If anything, the representative nature of local politics has

been

narrowed under nonpartisanship.
In

his study of nonpartisan elections,

Adrian concluded that non-

partisanship has the following characteristics which he offered as propositions:
(1) it

tends to weaken parties wherever

it

is in

operation;

(2)

5

because voters

distinguish between partisan and nonpartisan participation, officeholders are

divided along these

52
53

op

same

lines and are required to separate their partisan and

.,
.

cit.

Characteristics of Nonpartisan
Elections, " American Political Science Review 46 (September, 1952), 766-76.

Charles Adrian,

"Some General

,

81

nonpartisan activity;

ment

(3)

nonpartisanship restricts the avenues for the recruit-

of candidates for partisan offices

and nonpartisan offices

alike;

for financing nonpartisan and partisan campaigns are segregated;

(5)

of fund-raising by candidates for nonpartisan offices are hampered;

encourages the avoidance of issues
ance for protest voting;
is

(8)

in

Although nonpartisanship
of municipal

campaigns;

reformers and

funds

methods
(6) it

does not make allow-

(7) it

nonpartisanship benefits incumbents; and

no collective responsibility

aim

in

(4)

(9)

there

a nonpartisan body.

may have
is

contributed to the n good government"

highly regarded today by

modern municipal

reformers, Nathan Mathews made an excellent point when he commented, "as
a city

it

is

a political institution, the people in the end will divide into parties; and

would seem extremely doubtful whether the present system (partisanship)^

however

illogical its foundation be, does not in fact produce better results, at

least in large cities, than

if

voters were divided into groups separated by

property, social or religious bounds."

54

Socio-Economic Characteristics and Their Relationship
To Governmental Form and Electoral System

The prestige
the late 1800's that

54

Quoted

in

of municipal

government had plummeted

such low ebb

to

Lord Bryce unsympathetically characterized

Banfield and Wilson, City Politics

,

0£. cit.

,

the cities as

154.

in

82

like the sick

man who

cannot find rest upon his own bed, but seeks to ease his

pain by moving from side to side.

1,55

Indeed, there

was hardly one

city in the

United States unscarred by the tentacles of corruption in the form of kickbacks,

extravagent spending and paid officeholders.

The muckraker, Lincoln Steffens

could appropriately write the book, Shame of the Cities
could also speak of the government

in

American

,

and Lord Bryce

cities as "the one

conspicuous

failure of the United States. "

A

half century later, a pessimistic Robert S. Allen stated

bluntly, although municipal

different apparatus.

government

at

it

more

mid-20th century was a somewhat

Allen wrote that local government "is a reeking shambles

58
of corruption, incompetence, waste and misrule. "

However,

was a

it

cannot be stated unequivocally that municipal government

much needed goods and services and

total failure, for the

were provided by

59

the urban political machines.’

But, in a

other functions

number

of

ways

urban political machines only benefited the very rich and the very poor.

55

The

James Bryce, American Commonwealth (New York: MacMillan Co.,

1891), 619-620.

56

Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: Hill and Wang,

1904).

57

58

Bryce, op, cR.

Robert

S.

,

Allen,

608.

Our Fair

City

,

(New York: Vanguard Press, 1947),

59

For a good discussion on this point see Robert Merton, Social Theory
71-81.
and Social Structure (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 19o7),
,

3.
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middle -class, many of

whom were businessmen

and professionals were

excluded, although they were continuously confronted with increased taxation.

Therefore, much of the opposition to machines came from the middle-class.
In

some cases,

this

group began
60

to

govern the cities and control the machines

from

the state house.

local

reform movements for the purpose of introducing a

But, in

most instances, middle-class leaders
style of

initiated

government

with emphasis on efficiency, honesty and economy.

The desire

of the middle-class for "good

emanate from what they

felt

were the

evils of

government" did not entirely

bossism and machines.

had a natural disdain towards the immigrants.

They also

Richard Hofstadter provided

the best analysis of the clash of these two cultures in the

Age

Reform

of

:

Out of the clash between the needs of the immigrants
and the sentiments of the natives there emerged two
thoroughly different systems of political ethics.
One founded upon the indigenous Yankee-Protestant
political traditions, and upon Middle-class life,
assumed and demanded the constant disinterested
activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued that
political life ought to be run, to a greater degree than
it was, in accordance with general principles and
abstract laws apart from and superior to personal
needs, and expressed a common feeling that government should be in good part an effort to moralize the
lives of individuals while economic life should be
.

/?

.

A

Boston, after the Irish immigrants took control of City Hall, the
Yankees tried to govern Boston from the State House. For example, the
police commissioner was appointed by the governor until 1962 0
In

1

84

intimately related to the stimulation and development
of individual character. The other system, founded

upon the European background

of the

immigrants, upon

their familiarity with independent political action,

their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and

upon the urgent needs that so often grew out of their
migration, took for granted that political life of the
individual would arise out of family needs interpreted
political civic relations chiefly in

terms

of personal

obligations and placed strong personal loyalties above

allegiance to abstract codes of laws or

The middle-class
political ethos

style of politics.

bility

style of politics

was basically

which resulted from

different and incompatible

Therefore, reform politics

between the two ethics

-

morals.^

-

from

its

particular

the immigrant's

an outcome of the incompati-

was spearheaded and supported by Anglo-Saxon

Protestant middle-class residents of the city.

6

(New York: Knopf, 1955), 8-9.
62

For a treatment

of the political ethos theory see,

Edward

C. Banfield

and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); ibid.,
"
"Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, American
Wolfinger
Political Science Review 58 (December, 1964), 884; and Raymond
"
Government,
City
of
Structure
and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the
American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 006-^26.
,

,
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This clash of ethics was reflected in the different types of political
structures favored by the middle-class as compared

immigrants.

Although,

"it

would be unwise

to

to

those favored by the

assert that there

is

a simple

casual relationship between public attitudes toward a particular governmental
feature and the likelihood that feature will be adopted," 63

it

is

safe to conclude

that there is a proclivity for the "middle-class ethos" to favor one type of

governmental form and the "immigrant ethos" another type.
then that the middle-class conception of politics with

its

It is

suggested

emphasis on honesty

and impartiality, implies an institituional arrangement of government of non64

partisanship, council-manager government and at large elections.

The

immigrant's notion of politics, based on familial relationship, idea of neighborhood, private interest to be fulfilled by seeking aid of politician, implies ward
elections, mayor-council government and partisanship.

63

Wolfinger and Field, o£.

64

am

£it.

,

311.

assuming, as Banfield and Wilson did that the middle-class has
concern for the public or civic interest while the
a public-regarding ethos i.e.
ethos, i.e., concern for private or
-regarding
immigrants have a private
I

individual interest.
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Socio-Economic Characteristics and Local Government
Structures
This historical review has suggested then that there
certain types of political structures to be located

in

is

a tendency for

a particular kind of socio-

economic environment.
But what political structures are likely

to

be located

in

a particular

kind of socio-economic environment?
Studies by John Kessel, Banfield and Wilson, Schnore and Alford, and

Alford and Scoble and Lineberry and Fowler and Liebman have

shown

that

council-manager governments were likely

to

all in

be located

ments of low percentage non-white, high income, low proportion
born and persons over 65 years

in

some way
environ-

of foreign

of age, high proportion of white collar

high educational level, rapid growth and medium-size cities.

workers,

Environments

where mayor-council governments were found manifested opposite characteristics.

60

65

John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment, "
American Political Science Review 56 (September, 1962), 616; Leo Schnore
and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics
of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert
Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of
American Cities, " Municipal Year Book (1965), 82-97; Banfield and Wilson,
op cit
Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fov/ler, "Reformism and Public
Policies in American Cities, " American Political Science Review 61
(September, 1967), 701; Charles Liebman, "Functional Differentiation and
'

,

,

.

.

;

,

Political Characteristics of Suburbs, "

American Journal of Sociology 66
(March, 1961), 485-491; Edgar Sherbenou, "Class Participation and the CouncilManager Plan, " Public Administration Review (Summer, 1961), 131-135.
,

1

,
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Charles Liebman studied thirty -three cities and twenty -one suburbs
with over 10,000 population in the Chicago metropolitan area.
to

determine whether functional types of

retail trade,

vary with respect

to

cities, e.g.,

manufacturing and

manager or non-manager government and

partisan and nonpartisan elections.

For example, do manufacturing

manager governments and nonpartisan elections? He found
variance in functional types with respect
vote but

it

was

that at least

statistically insignificant.

some

form

to

form

of

of

cities have

that there

was some

government and partisan

Liebman was compelled

to conclude

structural and institutional characteristics of governments

did not vary with respect to the city's function.
the

Liebman wanted

61 6

To phrase

this

another way,

government and the type of elections did not correlate with

the

variance in the functional types of cities.

John Kessel studied
250,000 population

to

all cities in the

discern

if

United States between 25,000 and

there was an affinity between the governmental

structure and the political environment.

The three basic forms

of municipal

government constituted the governmental structure and indicators
political

environment were community size,

foreign born and economic base.

between a particular environment,

66

Ibid.

city

growth rate, percent of

Kessel found that there
i.e.

of the

is

a correlation

certain types of cities are likely to

,

,
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have certain types of governmental forms.

governments piedominate
is

in large

used largely by medium-size

For example, mayor-council

and small cities, while manager government

cities.

Although, Kessel demonstrated a

connection between environment and governmental form, he was unable to

prove that connection necessarily follows.
partially

from

the fact that there are

ment adopts a particular form

of

His inability to do such results

many reasons why a

government.

Some

particular environ-

of Kessel’s conclusions

are used as hypotheses in the present study.
In a study of three

"urbanized areas,

"

various social and economic characteristics.

,

thesis under investigation
its political

in the twenty-five largest

Leo Schnore and Robert Alford related governmental form

to social structure, i.e.

explain

hundred suburbs

was

that

structure.

socio-economic factors

They wanted

to

of a city

The

may

"determine whether suburbs

possessing different forms of government display measurable differences

socio-economic characteristics.
by Liebman,

form

of

i.e.

for

This

is

the reverse of the question asked

A

list of

each suburb.

some eighteen socio-economic

op

.

cit

.

characteristics

Schnore and Alford did find some correlations

between form of government and social structure, e.g.

67

in

do different functional types of cities differ with respect to

government?

was compiled

67

partially

mayor-council

89

government

is likely to

educated area.

be found in a high non-white, high ethnic and low

Furthermore, they conclusively stated

environment "does tend

to

that the council -manager

be the natural habitat of the upper middle-class." 68

But exhibiting some degree of uncertainty, Schnore and Alford also stated that
they could not "explain the differences in political structures in terms of the

above compositional characteristics per se.
connections are blurred.

"

69
In

other words, the causal

But their findings do suggest that form of government

and socio-economic characteristics possibly would make a difference
certain areas of local decision-making, e.g.

,

annexation decisions.

Robert Alford and Harry Scoble extended the findings
studies - Kessel,

in

Liebman and Schnore and Alford

-

of previous

which indicated a relation-

ship between the form of government and socio-economic characteristics to all
cities

than

over 25,000 population.

assume

the answer)

of a city be related to its

which they used were:

They attempted

why should
form

social

of

to

political and

empirically answer (rather

socio-economic characteristics

government? The three major social variables

heterogeneity (religion, race and ethnicity);

class composition (proportion of persons in white collar occupations or with
college education); and population growth and mobility.

68

69

o£„ cit.

op

.

Clt .

,

15.

They found

that

almost

90

all of

these variables were associated with form of government.

In

reaching

a possible causal connection, Alford and Scoble concluded that
mobility

seemingly explains the association of economic and class composition
with
form.

Therefore, they saw mobility of the population

- with qualifications -

as a significant variable in explaining the interrelationship of socio-economic

factors and form of government.

Lineberry and Fowler,

in their study of

institutions, derived conclusions

and Alford.

which were

at

reformed and unreformed
variance with those of Schnore

Although they acknowledged the fact that "varying samples may

produce varying conclusion, "

70
they concluded that their data did not

corroborate the fact that 'reformed’ cities

(i.e.,

council-manager) are the

'natural habitate of the upper middle-class." Furthermore, they concluded the
"cities with

in

terms

of

reformed and unreformed
demographic variables.

institutions are not

markedly different

Indeed some variables, like income, run

counter to the popular hypothesis that reformed cities are havens of the

middle -clas s.

"

71

But, the study by Sherbenou

supported the notion that

council -manager governments were located where persons of middle-class
status resided.

70
71

He ranked seventy-four suburbs

op. cit.

,

706.

op. cit .

,

7 15.

in the

Chicago metropolitan
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area according

to

cities with highest

median value of homes and found

home

and was not prevalent

in

that in 18 of the twenty

values, council-manager government was prevalent

any of the 31 cities with the lowest home values.

Banfield and Wilson concluded that ethnicity was the most important

independent variable in explaining the differences

in local political

Manager governments were located where there was
population while mayor-council governments

percentage of immigrants

structures.

a high Anglo-Saxon

were found

in cities

with high

in the population.

Summary
The reform movement spawned
structures and electoral systems

in

the alteration or modification of political

innumerable

cities.

Most frequently

council-manager governments were substituted for mayor-council governments
while nonpartisan electoral systems replaced partisan electoral systems.

Although the number of cities which adopted the manager system did not surpass
those using the mayor=council system, 43% of cities with over 5,000 population

presently operate under the manager system.

The

institution of the nonpartisan

electoral system met with greater success than did the manager form of

government.
elections.

In cities with

over 5,000 population, 64.9% utilize nonpartisan

92

As

the

reform movement was basically a movement by

the middle-class

for power redistribution and the establishment of those principles and

mechanisms
efficient

of

government which they thought would assure

government,

" the adoption of

nonpartisan electoral system occurred

middle-class.

manager form
in

of

,T

better,

more

government and

the

environments characterized as

Several studies concluded that political structures and electoral

systems were related

to the

socio-economic environment.

that cities with high percentages of high

These studies found

income persons, high white collar

population, high population growth, low immigrant population, high mobility,
high

home-ownership and high percentage

likely to have the

In other

manager form

of

of college educated persons,

were

government and nonpartisan electoral system.

words, there was a high positive correlation between cities with middle-

class social indicators and

Through

the use of

manager governments and nonpartisan
new and different empirical

data, the following

chapter will re-examine some of the conclusions arrived
cited in this chapter.

The attempt

elections.

at

by the studies

will be to further elucidate the apparent

relationship between the socio-economic environment and the political structure.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

At this point,

it

is

appropriate to re-emphasize one of the major theses

of this study cited in Chapter II, that there is a relationship between

government and socio-economic characteristics.

It

form

of

will be recalled that this

thesis in turn resulted in three subsidiary hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS

I
Manager governments are likely
manifest a more rapid population growth and rate
of mobility than mayor-council governments.

HYPOTHESIS

.

II

to

Manager government more than

.

mayor-council governments are likely to have a
higher percentage of college educated persons; a
higher percentage of white collar workers; a lower
percentage of persons earning $3,000 or less; a
higher percentage of persons earning $10,000 or
more and a higher percentage of homeowners.

HYPOTHESIS

III

.

Mayor-council governments are
communities with higher non-

likely to be located in

white and a higher ethnic population than manager

governments.

As also indicated

in

Chapter

II,

the

forms

of

government were

the

mayor-council and council-manager, with the commission form being eliminated
because of too few

in the

sample

to

prove of value

economic characteristics were defined

as:

(1)

in the analysis.

The socio-

population growth and mobility;
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(^)

social class; and

(3)

Because forms

of

population homogeneity.

government are not equally distributed regionally,

region was used as an intervening variable in examining the hypothesized
relationships.

For example, the Far West has more manager

Northeast has more mayor-council cities.

Therefore, some associations of

socio-economic variables with form of government may be due
variation.

cities while the

to regional

Table VII provides the regional distribution of cities

TABLE

in the

sample.

VII

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF GOVERNMENT

Type

Mayor-Council

Manager

Northeast

North Central

105

94

33

14

19

41

116

136

The Relationship Between Population Growth, Mobility and Form
Hypothesis

Far West

South

of

Government

I

Findings of the relationship between form of government and population

growth and mobility are presented

in

Table VIII.

-

1
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TABLE

VIII

COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM
OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics

%

Mayor-Council

Population change 1950-1960

Mobility

N

=

The

table

shows

manager governments.
the

means

that rapidly

Manager

5.

8. 1

46.3

46.7

246

312

growing communities are likely

Although the trend

is

is statistically significant at the

to

have

not dramatic, the difference in

.01 level.

Table VIII also suggests

that there is no significant difference between mobility in mayor-council and

manager

cities.

However,

the findings in Table VIII

effect of region

was not considered.

manager

because manager

cities

may be due

to the fact that the

For example, growth may be greater

cities are located primarily in the

and the Far West has a greater growth than any other region.

And

in

Far West
the

apparent absence of a relationship between mobility and manager government
likewise

may be due

to the factor of region.

Table IX begins to provide

region.
insight into these queries by relating growth and mobility with
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TABLE

IX

COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY
REGION
No rtheast

Characteristics

%

Population change
1950-1960

Mobility

N =
F = .01

The

North Central

South

2.2

8.5

6.8

9.1

23.9

22.5

11.8

23.8

124

136

149

149

Far West

level of significance

table reveals a statistically significant difference in the

regions for both variables.

Thus, growth

is

means between

greatest in the Far West, the

region with the most manager cities and least

in the

Northeast, the region

with the most mayor-council cities, with a 6. 9% difference between the
population growth in the Far West and that in the Northeast.

In

other words,

population increased over four times greater in the Far West than

Northeast.

Mobility, as

shown

in

Table IX,

is

mean

it

did in the

distributed about equally, with

the exception of the South which had the lowest rate of mobility.

vaiiable
Consequently, the introduction of region as an intervening
population
Table IX begins to suggest a more precise association between

growth, mobility and form of government.

Since region suggests this

in

.
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additional perspective, the association of population growth and mobility with

form of government was examined within region
Table

government

manager

X shows

is

that

when

the association

in

Table X.

between growth and form of

analyzed within region, the apparent relationship of growth with

cities disappears in the Northeast; is

Central area; and

is

attained

which have more manager

more

weak but noticeable

in the

North

clearly in the South and Far West - regions

cities.

TABLE X
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY REGION
AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Northeast

Characteristics

%

Population change
1950-1960

Mobility

10.6

3.1

7.9

5.8

8.5

20.0

34.9

12.8

11.4

16.6

22.4

94

41

33

116

14

136

2.2

1.8

9.0

28.4
19

105

F = .01

Man.

Man.

1

Far West
M. C. Man

South
C.

M. C.

23.

N =

North Central
Man.
M. C.

M.

level of significance

Based on

the evidence in Table X, the salient conclusion is that

rapid growth takes place in the Far West, South, or North Central,
likely to occur in

manager

cities than

mayor-council

cities.

it

when

is

more
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In

regard

to mobility,

cities in the Northeast,

X

Table

suggests that the population

in

manager

North Central and Far West are more mobile than the

population in mayor-council and manager cities in the South.

population in

manager

more mobile

than the population in

cities in the Northeast,

In addition,

North Central, and Far West are

mayor— council

cities of those regions.

No

significant difference in mobility prevails in the South between the two forms
of government.

The data from Table X, therefore confirms
region

is

manager

the hypothesis that

when

included as an intervening variable, population growth jls_ greater in
cities than

association

is

mayor-council

non-existent

in the

cities with the

Northeast.

acknowledgment

Mobility is likewise associated

with the manager form of government, when region

vening variable,

in

that the

is

included as an inter-

every area except the South.

Implicit in these findings is that region

is

an important intervening

variable in any attempts to explain the relationship of population growth and
mobility to form of government.

The Relationship Between Social Class and Form

of

Government

-

Hypothesis

Table XI presents the analysis of the relationship between the various
social class variables with

an intervening variable.
hypothesis.

form

of

government, without considering region as

The findings offer inconclusive support

to the

II
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Thus, Table XI suggests that manager government when compared

mayor-council government does have a higher percentage
four years of college or

more and does have

white collar workers.

But the difference

earning $3, 000 or less

is

a

to

of population with

somewhat higher percentage

in the

of

percentage of the population

inconsequential, while the mayor-council cities have

higher percentages of the population earning $10,000 or

more and owning homes.

TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Mayor-Council

Social Class Variables

Manager

%

Pop. 4 yrs. of college or more*

17. 7

30.9

%

Pop. white collar workers /

46.0

48.3

%

Pop. earning $3,000 or less/

46.7

46.3

%

Pop. earnings $10,000 or

47.2

43.2

%

Pop. homeowners

69.0

66.7

more*

N =

312

246

*F =
/ F =

As

.01 level of significance
.05 level of significance

in the

case of Hypothesis

I,

additional sophistication

the analysis by introducing the effects of region.

was sought

Table XII suggests the

without
variance according to region for each of the social class variables

in

11

100

considering form of government.

The

table suggests that the North Central region and higher percentage

of population with 4 years of college or

more and

that the Northeast had the

highest percentage of white collar workers, the highest percentage of the
population with income under $3,000 and over $10,000 and the highest per-

centage of homeowners.

TABLE XII
COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY REGION
Social Class Cariables

Northeast

North Central

South

Far West

%

Pop. 4 yrs. college or more*

11.9

16.4

12.4

11.6

%

Pop. white collar workers*

49.5

48.8

43.

48.3

%

Pop. earnings $3,000 or less*

22.7

16.7

%

Pop. earnings $10,000 or more /

1.3

1.0

1.

% Homeowners

2.7

2.5

2.3

N =

124

136

149

*F = .01
/F = 05
.

The South had

7.0

level of significance
level of significance

the lowest percentage of persons

employed

in

white collar

or
occupations and also the lowest percentage of persons earning $10,000

16.9
.8

2.4
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more.

The difference

percentage of homeowners seemed negligible.

in the

The basic issue

in

terms

of this hypothesis,

however,

is

what effect

does region have upon the hypothesized relationship between social class and

form

of

government.

Table XIII

is

an attempt to analyze this relationship

within region.

Table XIII consequently suggests that
four years of college or

located in

manager

class variables to

association

is

more and more

in

every region more persons with

white collar workers are likely to be

Therefore, the relationship of these two social

cities.

manager

cities as revealed in

Table XI remains when the

analyzed within regions.

Table XIII also suggests that manager cities

North Central are likely

to

in the

Northeast and

be inhabited by a greater percentage of persons
South and Far West

more persons earning

earning $3,000 or under while

in the

$3,000 or under are located

mayor-council cities than manager

The likelihood

that

in

more persons earning

cities.

$10, 000 or over would be

located in mayor-council cities, as suggested in Table XI, disappears once
this

apparent relationship

is not great,

in

manager

is

analyzed within regions.

Although the difference

persons earning $10,000 or more are more likely

cities.

to

be found
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Analyzing thG relationship of homeowners to form of government reveals
that a greater percentage of

homeowners are more

likely to be found in

and Far West with no discernible difference

cities in the South

Central cities between manager and mayor-council cities.

more homeowners

mayor-council cities than manager

in

in the

manager

North

The Northeast had

cities.

Therefore, Table XIII presents the following evidence for Hypothesis
II:

a higher percentage of college educated persons and white collar workers

are, as hypothesized, found in

manager

income under $3,000

cities; that

relates to region rather than form of government; that

a higher percentage of persons earning $10,000 or
that

homeownership

is

related

Population Homogeneity and

more

Form

to

of

manager

more

in

cities do have

each region; and

region than form of government.

Government

-

Hypothesis III

Table XIV, present the relationship between population homogeneity and

form

of

government without considering region.

not great, Table

mayor-council

XIV

cities.

Although the difference

is

reveals a greater percentage of non-white population in

Only a

slight difference is indicated

between the per-

centage of ethnicity of mayor-council cities and that of manager cities.

But again, region

is of

importance

in

clearly showing the relationship

between population homogeneity and form of government.

Population

homo-

1
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TABLE XIV
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics

Mayor-Council

Manager

% Non -whites

46.0

43.3

%

44. 8

44.

Ethnicity

N =

246

312

geneity, like forms of government, is unequally distributed in the United

Table

States.

XV

presents the relationship of population homogeneity and

region without considering form of government.

Table

XV

indicates that the Northeast has both a greater percentage of

non-white population and a greater percentage of ethnicity than the North
Central, South or Far West.

The difference

in the

population in the Northeast and the South however,

centage of non-white population

is

The lowest per-

is slight.

located in the North Central.

Northeast, the percentage of ethnicity

West

percentage of non-white

in the

Excluding the

North Central, South and Far

about even.

is

But additional questions were raised by the findings

and XV.

For example, what

in

Tables

XIV

effect does region have upon the relationship

105

TABLE XV
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY REGION
Northeast

Characteristics

North Central

South

Far West

% Non -white

47.7

39.3

46.5

44.7

%

48.3

42.8

43.5

43.5

124

136

149

149

Ethnicity

N =

between the percent of non-white population and mayor-council

cities ?

Does

region significantly affect the association between the percentage of ethnicity

and mayor-council cities

?

Do mayor-council

cities in the Northeast have a

greater percentage of non-white population and a greater percentage of
ethnicity than mayor-council cities in the South, North Central or

Table

XVI

provides answers to these queries.

of the relationship

XVI

Table

Far West

?

presents the analysis

between population homogeneity and form of government

within region.

Table

XVI

reveals that the association of a greater percentage of non-

white population with mayor-council cities disappears
South.

Only

in the

North Central and Far West

is

is

Northeast and

there a higher percentage

than
of non-white population in mayor-council cities

region

in the

manager

cities.

Thus,

relationship between nonof extreme importance in assessing the

1
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white population and mayor-council cities.

TABLE XVI
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY REGION AND FORM
OF GOVERNMENT
Northeast

Characteristics

M.C.

Man.

% Non -white

47.6

48.

%

47.3

54.5

Ethnicity

N =

105

North Central
M.C.
Man.

M. C.

Man.

45.9

41.7

42.3

47.6

44.7

39.3

44.5

41.8

39.4

44.7

41.2

42.8

94

41

33

116

14

136

19

Furthermore, Table XVI suggests that only

in the

South

North Central

Far West
M. C. Man.

is

there a higher percentage of ethnicity in mayor-council cities than manager
cities, while in the

Northeast, South and Far West manager cities show a

greater percentage of ethnicity than mayor-council cities.

Therefore, the

association of greater percentages of non-white population and ethnicity with

mayor-council

cities, as

the North Central

when

revealed

in

Table XIV, continued

the relationship

was analyzed within

to exist

region.

only in
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Summary
The findings presented

in this

chapter are supportive

of the three hypotheses under investigation.

However,

it

in

some instances

was also discovered

that in other instances, the data did not provide support for the hypotheses.

may

be recalled that the three hypotheses were

(1)

that

It

manager governments

are likely to be located in cities with high population growth and high mobility;
(2) that

manager governments are

likely to have higher percentages of college

educated persons, white collar workers, and homeowners, persons earning

$10,000 or more and a lower percentage of persons earning $3,000 or less
than mayor-council governments;
likely to be located in

(3)

that

mayor-council governments are

communities with higher percentage

ethnic populations than

of non-white and

manager governments.

Without considering the effects of region part of Hypothesis

confirmed

- that

manager governments were

However, the difference

communities.

likely to

be

in

was

rapidly growing

in the rate of mobility

communities and mayor-council was negligible.

I

between manager

Also, not considering region

as a possible intervening variable, the findings on social class variables

(Hypothesis
that

II)

manager

were basically consistent with those

cities have "slightly

more educated

of

Lineberry and Fowler

population and slightly

higher white collar population, " while mayor-council cities have higher

108

Manager governments, as hypothesized, had

incomes.

a lower percentage of

persons earning $3,000 or less although not great, but more homeowners were

manager

not likely to be located in

cities as hypothesized.

But, essentially,

there was no distinctive difference in demographic composition between manager
cities and

mayor-council

cities.

Again, excluding a consideration of region,

Hypothesis III was confirmed on both counts,

i.e.

,

that

mayor-council

governments had greater non-white and ethnic populations than manager governments.

This finding

is

similar to those of previous studies.

Based upon additional
is

findings and analysis

it

is

concluded that region

a significant intervening variable in explaining the relationship between

socio-economic environment and
findings

were smilar

in

political structures.

regard to region being an important factor

the structure of local government.

When

be located

in

explaining

*

the influence of region

findings emerged.

Wolfinger and Field

was considered, some other interesting

Manager governments with region controlled continued

in rapidly

to

growing communities, except the Northeast, thus further

corroborating Hypothesis

I

and the previous fundings of Kessel, Schnore and

"''Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the
Structure of City Government, " American Political Science Review 60
,

(June, 1966), 306-326.
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Alford, Alford and Scoblo, and Linoberry

find

Fowler.

Mobility emerged as

being related to manager governments, support for Hypothesis

except the South.

Also

regard

in

to mobility, the findings

I,

were similar

Alford and Scoble that "eastern cities with high mobility are likely

manager governments.
even within regions,

"

3

regions

in all

to

to

have

But where they found that "mobility remains important

from

the findings

this analysis lead to the conclusion that

mobility is important only within regions, otherwise no association between

mobility and manager government

is

More support was provided

demonstrated.

for the Hypothesis II that

manager

cities

are likely to be inhabited by the middle-class when the association was examined
/

within regions.

manager

But,

it

cannot be concluded as Schnore and Alford did that

cities are the "natural habitat of the

governments are
populations and

upper middle -class.

likely to have high educated, white collar and

more homeowners

only

in the

4

"

Manager

income

South and Far West.

o

John Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A
Statistical Note about American Cities, " American Political Science Review
56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of
Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs, " Administrative
Science Quarterly 8 (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble,
"Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of Cities, " Municipal Year Book
(Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965); Lineberry and
,

,

Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities,
Political Science Review 61 (September, 1967), 706.
,

° Alford

and Scoble, ibid

,

Schnore and Alford, o£.

89

.

ait.,

15.

"

American

,

no

When mayor-council government was viewed from

within region,

it

was

found that the association of mayor-council cities with non-white population
held only in the North Central and Far West.

region

is

controlled, there

composition. "

5

Ethnicity

is

John Kessel had found that "when

no relation between form and non-whites

is likely to

be associated with mayor-council

cities

only in the North Central.
In the following Chapter, the effects that social indicators and political

structure variables have upon voter turnout rate shall be examined.

5

Kessel, op

.

cit.
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CHAPTER V

VOTER TURNOUT

IN

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

The preceding chapter was an attempt

to

demonstrate the relationship

between various socio-economic characteristics and the
present chapter

is

political structure.

The

an effort to relate form of government, type of electoral

system, and socio-economic characteristics

The working hypothesis

is that

municipal election turnout.

to voter turnout at the local level.

these variables are determining factors in

Thus, voter turnout

is the

dependent variable,

while the independent variables are form of government, type of electoral system,

and the socio-economic indices.

As

indicated in Chapter

II,

voter turnout

is

measured by

the election

turnout figures for two mayoralty or councilmanic elections in each city in this

study from 1961 through 1968.
council and

manager forms

Form

of

government constitutes the mayor-

of local government, while the electoral

system

refers to partisan and nonpartisan elections.

The socio-economic indices are

once more divided into three classifications:

(1)

mobility;

(2)

social class; and

(3)

population growth and

population homogeneity.

Again, region

is

utilized as an intervening variable.

For purposes

of comparability, those cities on

which complete data

^
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could not be obtained were eliminated from the analysis.

Complete data

constituted having information on voter turnout, type of government, type of

electoral system, and the socio-economic characteristics.
list of

Thus, the original

558 cities was reduced to 551.

Determinants of Voter Turnout

Form

of

Government
Political structures can inhibit or promote voter turnout.

assumed by each structure depends on
assumed

that the

the particular type of structure.

It

is

mayor-council form of government provides easy accessibility

for the expression of group and individual interests.

widespread group representation and
elements of the population.

It is

it

Furthermore,

it

allows

caters to the demands of various

assumed

that

manager government

representation and that in the manager environment there

agreement on

The role

is

limits

general and basic

the fundamental issues and principles of society.

HYPOTHESIS

I.

Therefore,

it

is

hypothesized that the

mayor-council form of government is more likely to
encourage and witness greater voter participation and
turnout than manager governments.

1

Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities,"
American Political Science Review 62 (September, 1968), 796. Lee and Alford
found that mayor-council partisan governments were likely to have greater
,

turnout than other forms.
the voter
In a study of city elections in Kansas, Clarence J. Hein found
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Electoral System

Partisan elections give vent to the various and sundry cleavages which
exist in the political system.

cleavages.

However, partisan elections may also create

Partisan elections permit parties to serve as generators of

issues, mobilizers of the electorate, and stimulators of interests.

HYPOTHESIS

Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections
exist than where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus,
nonpartisanship has the effect of diminishing voter
turnout.

II .

^

HYPOTHESIS

III
It is additionally hypothesized that where
partisan elections are combined with the mayor-council form
of government, voter turnout is likely to be greater than
where other combinations of electoral systems and forms
of

government

.

exist.

^

participation varied with the particular system of government.

commission

cities had the highest turnout, while

manager

However,
had the next

cities

highest and mayor-council cities the lowest.

See his Voter Participation in City
Elections with Populations Between 5,000 and 50,000 in Kansas (Lawrence,
Kansas: Governmental Research Bureau, University of Kansas, 1958). Lee's
and Alford's data led them to conclude that form of government was more strongly
,

related to turnout than form of election and that turnout was greater in non-

(mayor -council) than in manager cities. Op. cit. 804. This
study challenges Hein's findings and tests Lee's and Alford's conclusions.

manager

cities

,

o

Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University
California Press, 1960); Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Communities
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1969), 224.
:

O

Lee and Alford,

jjp.

cit.

of
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4

Socio-Economic Characteristics
Population Growth and Mobility

community, the more
structure; thus, the

likely that he will

more

.

The longer a person

become integrated

into the

community

he will participate in the affairs of the community.

Persons are also confronted with

the task of fulfilling a residency requirement.

Ruth Dixon stated that "the high level of mobility

makes residence requirements especially
from

lives in a

in the

American population

significant as factors barring persons

voting. "

HYPOTHESIS

IV
Therefore, it is hypothesized that cities
with rapid population growth and high mobility will experience
low voter turnout.
Social Class.
of

.

"The more educated person

government on the individual than

4

is

more aware

is

of the

impact

the person of less education.

Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959);
Lester Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1965); Ruth B. Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections" (unpublished
Master’s thesis, University of California, 1966); and Harry Sharp’s study of
Detroit indicated that migration leads to low voter turnout, "Migration and
Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Community, " Public Opinion Quarterly 19,
(1955), 206-209.
Ibid .

;

,

5

Dixon, ’"Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections.
0

Milbraith, Political Participation

,

op

.

cit.

,

" 0£.

121-122.

cit.

6.

HYPOTHESIS V

Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
is likely to increase in cities as the percentage of
well-educated (college) persons in the population increases.
.

turnout

White collar employed persons, homeowners, and high income persons

presumably have a stake
happening.

in the

community and are highly interested

Consequently, they are

more

in

what

is

likely to turn out to vote.

HYPOTHESIS VI Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout should be higher in those cities with a higher percentage of white collar employees, homeowners, and a
.

higher percentage of high income persons than in cities
with high percentages of opposite characteristics.
Population Homogeneity

.

Blacks, who constitute the largest percentage

of the non-white category, are concentrated at the bottom end of the socio-

economic ladder.
others, and

it

Persons of low socio-economic rank tend

can be expected that those

remain away from the

in the

to vote less than

non-white group are prone to

polls.

HYPOTHESIS VII

Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter
turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high percentage
of non-white population.

The persistence

.

of ethnic voting has

been examined by a number of

researchers, among them Parenti, Wolfinger and Gabriel.

7

A

.

.

prerequisite

to high ethnic voting is ethnic salience.

7

Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic
Identification," American Political Science Review 61 (September, 1967), 717;
Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting,
American Political Science Review 59 (December, 1965), 896-908; and Richard
(unA. Gabriel, "Ethnic Attitudes and Political Behavior in City and Suburb"
published Ph. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1969).
,

,

,

,
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HYPOTHESIS

VIII.

Therefore,

hypothesized that
foreign-born
and population of native-mixed parentage) will experience
low voter turnout.
it is

cities with high ethnic populations

(i.e.

,

Findings

The
form

of

first part of the analysis will be that of the relationship

between

government, electoral systems, and voter turnout, i.e., Hypothesis

through Hypothesis III.

This

is

presented

Tables XVII through XXIII.

in

I

The

second part of the analysis will present the data on the relationship between

socio-economic indices and voter turnout,
Hypothesis VIII.
Finally, and

This

is

demonstrated

more importantly,

in

i.e.

Hypothesis IV through

Tables XXIV through XXXV.

the effect of

form

of

government electoral

systems, and the socio-economic indices will be analyzed as they collectively
affect voting turnout.

Form

of

Table

XXXVI

deals with this analysis.

Government, Electoral System, and Voter Turnout

Form

of

Government

.

I,

i.e.

mayor-council

The findings seem

that turnout is likely to be greater in

than in manager cities.
cities.

I

Table XVII presents the relationship between

voter turnout and form of government.

Hypothesis

- Part

Turnout

in

manager

cities

was

to

corroborate

mayor-council cities

less than half of that in
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TABLE XVII

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics

Mayor-Council

Manager

N =

246

312

Voter Turnout

38%

16%

Table XVIII shows the findings of turnout regionally.

Far West and South had a

far lower turnout than cities in the other regions.

can, therefore, be asked which factors

West which resulted
elections?

Why

areas? Also,

did

the

in a

more people

in

to vote in local

vote in the Northeast and North Central

in the

of

manager

Table XVII showed that manager cities had a

manager

was turnout lower

It

the South and Far

Far West and South had a greater percentage

lower turnout than mayor-council

is,

were associated with

lower number of people turning out

cities than the other regions.

and the South and

Cities in the

cities.

Was

the low turnout in the

cities an expression of the

Far West

same phenomenon? That

Far West and South because they had more manager

cities than the other regions?

Or was turnout lower

in

manager

cities

because

they happened to be located to a greater extent in the Far West and South?
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TABLE

XVIII

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION
Characteristics

N =
Voter Turnout

Table

XIX

Northeast

North Central

124

131

37%

39%

Far West

South

146

150

17%

11%

attempts to answer these questions by controlling for region and

subsequently relating turnout to form of government.

TABLE XIX

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT
North Central
Man.
M.C. Man. M.C.
Northeast

N =

105

Voter Turnout

41%

Far West

South

M.

C.

Man M.C. Man.

19

94

41

33

116

14

136

42%

44%

34%

19%

12%

12%

10%

Although low turnout continued to be associated with the South and Far

West,
in

it

was again substantiated

manager

that fewer people vote in local elections held

cities with one exception, the Northeast.

However, when

the effect

119

of region

was considered,

the difference in turnout in mayor-council cities

and manage 1 cities was not nearly as great as the difference when there
was a
lack of regional consideration as indicated in Table XVII.

The only region which

continued to manifest any significant degree of difference was the North Central
area, which showed a ten percent difference in turnout

manager

cities.

in

mayor -council and

Nevertheless, although the findings were not dramatic when

the influence of region

was accounted

for, they

do support the first hypothesis

that turnout is likely to be higher in mayor-council cities than in

manager

cities.

Electoral System

system

affects turnout.

have upon turnout

in

.

Hypothesis II suggested that the type of electoral

What

effect does the difference in electoral

systems

each region? This hypothesis and question will be

investigated in the following two tables.

Table

XX

shows the overall relationship between voter turnout and

electoral system.

TABLE XX

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Partisan

Nonpartisan

N =

181

370

Voter Turnout

34%

25%

the

120

Cities with partisan elections experienced a greater turnout than

those with nonpartisan elections, as was suggested in Hypothesis

II.

But what effect does region have upon the association between electoral

systems and voter turnout? Table XXI presents

the relationship between voter

turnout and electoral systems by region.

The findings presented

in this table

cannot be considered as conclusive,

but merely suggestive, for there were only sixteen nonpartisan cities in the

Northeast, no partisan elections in the Far West, and the North Central area

had almost an even division between nonpartisan and partisan election turnout
in the

one region where partisan and non-partisan cities were almost equal

in

number.

TABLE XXI

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Northeast

P

North Central

Far West

South

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

N =

108

16

67

64

6

140

0

150

Voter Turnout

42%

33%

40%

42%

20%

13%

*

10%

*Many Far West

cities,

motivated by the progressive movement around
See Lee, Politics of

the turn of the century abandoned partisan elections.

Nonpartisanship

,

op

.

cit.

,
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Nevertheless, when region was controlled, the hypothesized relationship between partisan elections exist in the Northeast and the South (even

though the South had more nonpartisan elections than partisan).
the

In addition in

Far West, where there are no partisan elections, voter turnout was

(10

percent) smaller than in any other region, regardless of form of election.

partisanship does heighten turnout, as was suggested in Hypothesis

Form

of

Government, Electoral System and Voter Turnout

Thus,

II.

.

Hypothesis

III suggested that turnout would be greater in mayor-council partisan cities

than in cities with other forms.

But was turnout greater?

the hypothesized relationship, e.g.

was turnout greater

in

Does region affect
mayor-council

partisan cities in the Northeast than in manager nonpartisan cities in the Far

West and South.

Tables XXII and XXIII provide partial answers.

shows the turnout rate by both form

of

Table XXII

governments and electoral systems

without considering region.

TABLE XXII

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
Mayor-Council

Manager

Partisan

41%

(146)

38%

(35)

Nonpartisan

32%

(94)

13%

(276)

,

,
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The data

Table XXII apparently substantiates Hypothesis

in

mayor-council partisan

cities are likely to have a greater turnout than cities

with other political and electoral forms, i.e.

manager

partisan, and

III, that

mayor-council nonpartisan,

manager nonpartisan, although manager partisan

cities

did have a turnout rate nearly as high as that of mayor-council partisan cities.
Also, indicated in Table
cities, partisan

respectively.
i.e.

XXII

is the fact that

voter turnout

is

higher in

mayor

or nonpartisan than in manager cities, partisan or nonpartisan,

Furthermore, the data demonstrated another interesting

that regardless of electoral form,

mayor-council cities

still

fact,

tend to have

a higher turnout than manager cities, thus further substantiating Hypothesis

Do these
region?

findings stand

when

this relationship is

Table XXIII, hopefully, provides the answer

table shows the voter turnout rate for

form

of

I.

examined within

to this question.

This

government and electoral system

by region.
Support for Hypothesis III, that mayor-council partisan cities tend
to

have greater turnout than cities with other political and electoral forms,

diminished when the influences of region were considered.

manager partisan

cities

mayor-council partisan
higher than that
council or

in

In the Northeast,

had a higher turnout, although by only
cities.

Turnout

in partisan elections,

2

however, remained

nonpartisan elections whether they were held

manager

cities, except in

percent, than

in

mayor-

one instance - the North Central.

This
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TABLE XXIII

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Mayor-Council

Manager

Northeast

43%
34%

(91)

Partisan
Nonpartisan

41%
48%

(51)

'Partisan

-

Nonpartisan

19%

Partisan
Nonpartisan

44%

(17)

T

(14)

North Central

(39)

35%
33%

(16)
(25)

South
(27)

12%

(113)

Far West
*

Partisan
Nonpartisan

12%

*No Partisan elections
'

Insufficient

sample

*

_
(14)

10%

(136)

,

124

provides further corroboration for Hypothesis

The data

Higher turnout

wash

A

Table XXIII further indicated that mayor-council nonpartisan

North Central has a greater turnout than

cities in the

did not

in

II.

in

out

manager partisan

when

cities than in

the effects of region

cities with other types.

manager nonpartisan

were accounted

significant finding which consistently appeared

cities

for.

was

that

mayor-

council cities attract a larger turnout than manager cities except in the instance
of partisan

mayor-council cities

in the

Northeast, regardless of whether

elections were partisan or nonpartisan.

Therefore, this

provides further confirmation of Hypothesis

Socio-Economic Indices and Voter Turnout
Population Growth and Mobility

.

fact apparently

I.

-

Part

II

Hypothesis IV indicated that cities

with rapidly growing populations and high mobility were likely to experience low

But was this hypothesis substantiated by the data, and how did

voter turnout.

form

of

government, electoral system and region affect the hypothesized

relationship?

The following four tables investigate

this proposition.

Table XXIV

provides the correlation coefficients of population growth and mobility with
voter turnout.

Part of Hypothesis IV
that cities with

is

corroborated by the data

growing or expanding populations are

out in elections.

Whether or not

in

Table XXIV, i.e.

likely to have a low turn-

this negative influence of

growth on turnout

,
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TABLE XXIV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY

Characteristics

All Cities

%

Population change 1950-1960*

%

Migrants from different county

Refers

to population

-.

N = 551

13

.04

increase

The standard of measure used herein is
The size of the product-moment
(-).

Pearson product-moment
(r) varies from +1
through 0 to -1. It provides two things: (1) the magnitude of the relationship
and (2) the direction of the relationship. For the purpose of this study the
coefficient

coefficients

very good;

the

coefficient

may be interpreted as follows: 0-3 = poor; 4-6 = average; 7-9 =
1.0= excellent. The coefficients are product-moment correlations

of the actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

disappears when form of government

is

considered will be analyzed below.

aspect of Hypothesis IV dealing with mobility
i.e.

that cities with high mobility

were

is

The

not substantiated by the data,

likely to experience low voter turnout.

Surprisingly, mobility was positively related to turnout, although not significantly.
In

Table

form

of

XXV

population growth and mobility will be analyzed with turnout by

government

to ascertain the effect of the latter.
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TABLE XXV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Mayor-Council
N = 240

Characteristics

%

Population change 1950-60

%

Migrants from different county

Manager

N = 311

-.08

-.07

.04

.06

The coefficients in this Table are product -moment correlations of the
actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

A

significant association of population growth and mobility with either

form of government was

However,

not demonstrated.

cities,

whether they had

mayor-council or manager governments, which experienced a substantial growth
in population

were

likely to have low turnout at the polls.

The

finding, although

not significant, did provide support for the population growth aspect of

Hypothesis IV.

Also, as shown in Table

growth had upon turnout was slightly less

XXV,
in

the negative effect that population

manager

cities than in

mayor-council

cities.

The positive association
XXIV, again appeared when form

of mobility with turnout suggested in Table

of

government was considered.

Furthermore,

mayoimobility was positively correlated with turnout in both manager and
council cities.

Again, although insignificant, this finding provided additional
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refutation of Hypothesis IV, i.e.

,

where mobility was

high, turnout

was

likely

to be low.

Population growth and mobility will now be examined by form of

government and electoral system; and by form
and region

in the

following two tables.

the effect of the combination of

form

of

government, electoral system

This analysis will attempt

of government, electoral

ascertain

to

system and region

upon the association of population growth and mobility with voter turnout.
Table

XXVI

assesses the relationship between voter turnout, and

population growth and mobility, while controlling for the effect of form of

government types and electoral system.

TABLE XXVI
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Characteristics

N =

%

Population change 1950-60

%

Migrants from different
county

The

coefficients are

Manager

Mayor--Council

P

NP

P

146

94

35

-. 12

-.07

-..

.08

.02

.

product-moment correlations of

percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

NP
276

14

-.07

19

.04

the actual
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As indicated
of governmental

growing

in the table,

cities, regardless of the

form and electoral system, are negatively related

The correlation, however, was stronger

turnout.

and manager partisan cities than

in other types.

in

combination

to

voter

mayor-council partisan

Although these correlations

are statistically insignificant, further support was provided for part one of
Hypothesis IV.
Mobility continued to be associated positively with turnout, save one
instance.

The correlation

of mobility with turnout

council nonpartisan cities.
of Hypothesis IV

was negative

in

mayor-

Overall conclusive support for the second aspect

was not demonstrated.

Because there are certain historical and cultural factors associated
with region, Table

XXVII

will analyze population growth and mobility with

turnout by form of government, electoral system and region.

explored

is

The question

what effect does region, combined with form of government and

electoral system, have upon the relationship of population growth and mobility

with turnout.

The data indicated

that

even with the influence of region controlled,

voter turnout continued to be lower

in cities

with a rapidly growing population

(with two exceptions) regardless of governmental

Only

in

manager partisan

cities

(.

form or electoral system.

02) in the North Central

association between growth and turnout.

was a positive

Although none of the correlations were
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TABLE XXVII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY REGION, GOVERNMENTAL FORM
AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Characteristics and Region

P
Northeast
% Population change 1950-60
% Migrants from different county
N =

Manager

Mayor-Council

-.30

NP

P

NP

14

-.43

*

-.

.08

-.50

91

14

17

-.09

-.21

.02

-. 15

.03
51

.20

13

.33

16

25

12

.

2

North Central

%
%
N

Population change 1950-60
Migrants from different county
=

.

39

South

%
%
N

Population change 1950-60
Migrants from different county
=

-.09

*

fO

*

-. 11

*

1 o 00

*

27

*

113

*

-. 13

*

.36

*

*

CO

Far West

%
%
N

Population change 1950-60
Migrants from different county
=

*
O'

14

O’

-. 11
.

12

136

Insufficient sample
All elections are nonpartisan
’

The coefficients are product-moment correlations
of population growth and mobility variables.

of the actual percentages

,
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dramatic, the highest happened

manager partisan

(-.30) and in

to

be located in mayor-council partisan cities

cities (-.43) in the Northeast.

Interestingly, the positive relationship of mobility with turnout while

continuing in the Northeast in partisan mayor-council cities and in the cities in

the Far West, changed dramatically in nonpartisan mayor-council cities in the

Northeast (-.50), and nonpartisan mayor-council and manager nonpartisan
cities of the South (-. 11 and -.08 respectively).

The data

point to the conclusion that a rapidly growing or expanding

population does not enhance the degree of voter turnout in any type of city.
is

true even

when

the influences of region are taken into account.

exception was manager partisan cities
the evidence presented,

confirmed on

it

is

this point, i.e.

in the

North Central.

The only

Thus, based upon

concluded that the first part of Hypothesis IV
that a rapidly

This

growing population

is

is likely to

decrease voter turnout.

A

mobile population does not have a negative effect upon voter turnout

rate in either type of city in the North Central or the Far West.

non-partisan cities in the South and

in

Therefore, the effect of

region altered the relationship between mobility and turnout
cities,

in

non-partisan mayor-council cities of the

Northeast, mobility did result in lower turnout.

and manager

However,

regardless of electoral system.

in

mayor-council
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The conclusion,
analysis

is that the

mobility

is likely to

in the

then,

second part

based on evidence from the greater part of the
of

Hypothesis IV

is

not corroborated, i.e., that

decrease voter turnout, except as a regional phenomenon

Northeast and South.
Social Class

.

Hypothesis

V suggested

that voter turnout

increase as the percentage of college educated persons
creased.

Also,

in cities with a

it

was hypothesized

in

was

likely to

in the population in-

Hypothesis VI that turnout would be higher

higher percentage of white collar employees, homeowners, and

a higher percentage of high income persons than in those cities with high

percentages of opposite characteristics.
these two hypotheses.

The following four tables

will analyze

Table XXVIII shows the correlation coefficients for

the social class variables with voter turnout for all cities.

The data do not provide support for Hypothesis
population was likely to increase turnout.

V, that a well-educated

This finding apparently refutes

conventional wisdom, for a well-educated population resulted

in

low turnout.

Subsequent tables will further analyze this finding.

Other surprising findings, which did not confirm Hypothesis
that white collar

workers were negatively related

to turnout

to turnout,

were

and that low income

increased turnout.
(% populated earning $3,000 or less) resulted in

earning $10,000 or more was positively related

VI,

Only

%

thus providing the
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TABLE XXVIII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIAL CLASS
VARIABLES
Characteristics

All Cities

N = 551

%

4 years of college or

%

white collar workers

more

-.06
-. 13

% homeowners

.00

%

population earning $3,000 or less

.02

%

population earning $10,000 or

more

.03

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual
percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.

The

only partial corroboration of Hypothesis VI.

findings on social class

may

be altered somewhat once the effects of government, electoral system and region
are controlled.

The data

in

Table XXIX show the effect of social class variables upon

turnout in mayor-council and manager cities.

With the exception of one variable, social class factors are positively
associated with turnout in manager cities.

V

and Hypothesis VI are confirmed, except

Thus, in manager cities Hypothesis
in

one instance, i.e., where high
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TABLE XXIX
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH SOCIAL CLASS
VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristcs

%

Mayor-Council
N = 240

population 4 years of college
or more

Manager
N = 311

.06

.06

%

white collar workers

-.33

.

%

honeowners

-.14

.05

%

earning $3, 000 or less

.01

.03

%

earning $10,000 or more

.01

-.04

The coefficients are product-moment correlations

10

of the actual

percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.

income population was negatively related

to turnout, therefore not likely to

result in increased voter turnout.

Although the negative findings

in

Table XXVIII of education and white

collar workers with turnout disappeared in

manager

cities,

(with the exception

showed a significant
noted), in mayor-council cities only college educated
and low) again positively
positive relationship to turnout with income (both high
associated with turnout, albeit at a .01 level.
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The data

Table

in

XXX

assess the relationship of voter turnout with

social class variables while controlling both for form of government and

electoral system.

Cities with a large college -educated population had an

increased turnout rate, whether or not they had mayor-council or manager

governments and partisan or non-partisan elections, thus providing further
confirmation of Hypothesis V.

White collar workers were

negatively related to turnout, regardless

of governmental type of electoral system.

in

Table XXIX of white collar workers and homeowners

council cities was
in

still

cities

cities,

turnout in

where home ownership

Negative relationships also appear (contrary

manager

to

mayor-

apparent when electoral systems were controlled, except

mayor-council nonpartisan

turnout.

in

The negative relationships discovered

except for the association between

to

is_likely to increase

Table

XXIX

% homeowners

findings)

and voting

turnout in the nonpartisan manager cities.

Table
of Table

in

XXX

in addition, offers further substantiation of the findings

XXIX regarding

the relationships between

mayor-council cities the nominally positive association specified

XXIX

in

Thus
Table

divides according to electoral form; whereas the relationships between

income and turnout for manager
in

income and turnout.

cities in

Table

Table XXX, regardless of electoral form.

XXIX

is additionally

confirmed

,
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TABLE XXX
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH SOCIAL CLASS
VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
Characteristcs

Mayor-Council

%

population 4 yrs. college or

%

white collar workers

more

% homeowners

Manager

P

NP

N=146

N=94

N=35

.04

.04

.13

.02

-.39

-.32

-26

.00

-.32

.21

-.20

.05

NP

P

N=276

%

earning $3, 000 or less

.08

-.08

.

08

.09

%

earning $10,000 or more

.02

-.01

-.

16

-.08

The

coefficient are

product-moment correlations

of the actual percentages

of the socio-economic characteristics.

Thus, when turnout and social class factors are analyzed according

governmental type and electoral system, confirmation
provided, i.e.

of Hypothesis

V

to

is

that voter turnout will be higher in those cities with a higher

percentage of well-educated (college) persons; however, support for Hypothesis

VI

is

inconclusive.

Because region

is

posited as an important intervening variable and

the social class factors, governmental forms and electoral systems are located

relationship
in different proporitions in different parts of the country, the
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between social class factors and turnout
Region may help

to

will be analyzed according to region.

account for some of the unexplained variance between voter

turnout and social class variables.

The data

in

Table XXI show the relationship between turnout and

social class variables by region, form of government and electoral system.
In the

Northeast and South, a large college -educated population w as
?

likely to increase turnout in all cities, regardless of

system.

government or electoral

Contradicting this finding, however, are the correlations suggesting

that large college educated population decreased turnout in the North Central

and Far West.

Therefore, only partial support was provided for Hypothesis V.

The negative relationships

in

Table

XXX

of white collar

and homeowners

with turnout continued and was strengthened in the Northeast, North Central

and Far West.

Furthermore, where percent of homeowners showed a positive

relationship to turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in Table
controlling for region in Table

XXXI

resulted

in

XXX,

a negative association in all

regions except the South and manager partisan cities in North Central.

percent of white collar showed a negative association with turnout

in

Also,

mayor-

council nonpartisan cities in the South.

The significance
accounted

for, but there

of

income remained about the same when region was

were a few exceptions.

The negative relationship

between high income and turnout was strengthened

in

manager partisan

cities
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TABLE XXXI
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIAL CLASS BY
REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Region and Social
Class

Mayor-Council

Manager

P

NP

.24
-.45
-.51

.30

.40

*

-.57
-.08

-.60
-.32

*

11

-. 11

.03

-.04
-.42

*

-.08

91

14

17

2

-.28

-. 10

-. 11

-. 12

-.35
-.03

-.60
-.23

.00

-.66

.26

.00

10

-. 10

.04

.30

.00

-.09

.34

-.06

51

39

16

25

12

*

.03

*

-.52

*

.00

*

10

*

.02

NP

P

Northeast

% 4 yrs. college or more
% white collar
% homeowners
% $3, 000 or under
% $10, 000 or over

.

N =

*

*

North Central

% 4 yrs. college or more
% white collar
% homeowners
% $3, 000 or under
% $10, 000 or over
N =

.

South

% 4 yrs. college or more
% white collar
% homeowners
% $3, 000 or under
% $10, 000 or over

*

10

*

*

.08

*

N =

4

27

% 4 yrs. college or more
% white collar
% homeowners
% $3, 000 or under
% $10, 000 or over

*

-. 13

*

-.24

*

-.49

*

-. 13

-. 16

*

-. 15

-. 10

*

.06

-.65

*

.06

N =

O'

O'
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*

.

.

.

.

15

.

12

113

Far West

*
*
*

14

Insufficient sample
'All elections are nonpartisan

The Coefficients are product-moment correlations
of the socio-economic characteristics.

of the actual percentages

1

in the

Northeast and
In

in

mayor-council nonpartisan

summary, through

lor Hypothesis V

in the South.

in

the Northeast and South.

The overall analysis leads

that sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses

Population Homogeneity

Hypothesis VI

II

.

V and

As hypothesized

II,

XXXIV

Hypothesis VI
to the conclusion

VI is lacking.

in

Hypothesis VI

1

and

respectively, cities with a high non-white population and a high

ethnic population are likely to have a lower voter turnout rate.

XXXI

Far West.

controlling for the influence of region, support

was provided only

was corroborated only

cities in the

and

XXXV

Tables XXXI 1,

provide the analysis of this hypothesis.

shows the relationship between turnout and homogeneity

Table XXXII

for all cities.

TABLE XXXI
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY
Characteristics

All Cities

N =551

%

non-white

.03

%

foreign born

.04

%

population native-mixed parentage

.00

product-moment correlations of the actual
characteristics.
homogeneity
percentages of the population

The

coefficients are
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The data indicated

that culturally and socially

resulted in increased turnout at the polls.

hererogeneous cities

Although the correlations were

insignificant, Hypothesis VII and Hypothesis VIII, i.e., that a large
non-white

population decreases voter turnout and that a large ethnic population results in

low turnout, respectively, were refuted by the findings of

XXXIII attempts
It

to

this table.

Table

discover the effect of form of government on these findings.

provides the association between voter turnout and population homogeneity by

form

of

government.

TABLE XXXIII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Characteristics

Mayor-Council
N = 240

Manager

N = 311

%

non-white

.

10

-.09

%

foreign born

.02

.05

%

population native -mixed parentage

.04

.08

The coefficients are product-moment correlations
percentage of the population homogeneity characteristics.

of the actual
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In ma.n3.ger cities, a large non— white population
in a

low voter turnout.

None of

were strong, although a

the correlations in Table

findings in Table

Hypothesis VIII, i.e.

and that ethnicity

in

,

XXXIII

in

manager

cities.

did not corroborate Hypothesis VII and

that a large non-white population will lower turnout

But does

it

make

elections are partisan or nonpartisan

XXXIV

XXXIII, however,

great proportions in the population will lead to a low voter

turnout respectively.

Table

likely to result

positive association continued to exist between turnout

and population homogeneity, except non-white

The

was

in

a difference in turnout whether or not

mayor-council and manager cities?

deals with this question.

TABLE XXXIV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
Characteristics

NP

P
N=146

%

non-white

%

foreign born

%

population native -mixed parentage

Manager

Mayor-Council

.

15

-.08
.02

P

NP

N=94

N=35

N=276

.01

-.35

-.06

14

.

18

-.05

.02

.

18

.07

.

The corefficients are product-moment correlations
percentages of the population homogeneity characteristics.

of the actual

,
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In those cities with

mayor-council government, a high non-white

population, foreign born and native-mixed parentage population were likely to

increase turnout, regardless of election type, except for foreign born
council partisan cities where a low turnout resulted.

in

mayor-

Substantial non-white

population in manager cities, whether or not they had partisan or non-partisan
elections, depressed voter turnout rate.

There was a relatively high correlation

(-.35) of non-white population and turnout in

manager partisan

Weak

cities.

positive relationships existed between turnout, foreign-born and native-mixed

parentage population in

all

manager

where foreign-born population
Hypothesis VII
cities, while part of

is

cities, except in

manager nonpartisan

cities

did not contribute to a greater turnout.

supported in manager cities but not

Hypothesis VIII

is

in

mayor-council

not substantiated by Table

XXXIV,

i.e.

that high ethnic population, (foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population)

are unequally distributed across regions, the relevant question

is

what

is the

relationship of population homogeneity to turnout when the effects of region are

held constant?

Will support for Hypothesis VIII be provided and/or

more

clearly delineated?

Table

XXXV

shows

the relationship

between voter turnout and population

homogeneity by form of government and electoral system while controlling
the influence of region.

for
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The data indicated
turnout

still

except

in

appeared

in

that non-white population positive association with

mayor-council

mayor-council nonpartisan

cities, both partisan

cities in the

and nonpartisan,

Far West.

In the

Far West,

a large non-white population was likely to result in a lower voter turnout rate.
In

manager

turnout

cities, the negative relationship

still

A

between non-white population and

existed, regardless of region or electoral system.

low turnout

in

mayor-council partisan

foreign -born population again prevailed in Table

The highest correlation was

in the

where there was a large

cities

XXXV

regardless of region.

The

North Central (-.31).

positive association

of foreign born with voter turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities indicated
in

Table

XXXIV disappeared

in the

South and North Central in Table

but was strengthened in the Northeast and Far West.

was

A

XXXV,

sizeable native population

likely to increase turnout only in Northeast mayor-council partisan cities,

North Central mayor-council nonpartisan

The analysis

cities.

of non-white population in Table

Hypothesis VII in manager cities.

But

in

XXXV

mayor-council

confirmed

cities,

support was

obtained only in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West.

It is

concluded, then, that a large non-white population was likely to decrease turnout in

manager

cities but not in

mayor-council

cities.
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TABLE XXXV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION
HOMOGENEITY BY REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Region and Population
Homogeneity

Northeast
% Non-white
% Foreign born
% Population native-mixed
parentage
=
N

Manager

Mayor--Council

NP

P

.20

-.01

.

.

P

NP

14

-.46

*

18

.34

*

29

*

2

-. 11

-.21

91

14

17

10

.03
-.06

-.23

-.07

-.01

-.02

17

.09

-.01

39

16

25

.

North Central

% Non -white
% Foreign Born
% Population native -mixed
parentage

N =

.

-.31
-.06
51

.

South

% Non -white
% Foreign born
% Population native-mixed
parentage

N =
Far West
% Non -white

%
%

Foreign born
Population native -mixed
parentage

N =

.09
-.03

*

-.12

*

**

.05

*

-. 14

.06

4

27

*

-.24

*

-. 17

*

.58

*

-.01

*

-. 14

*

-.05

*

O'

14

113

0’

136

Insufficient sample
'All elections are nonpartisan

product-moment correlations
characteristics.
homogeneity
the population

The

coefficients are

of the actual percentages of

,

,
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For the most part evidence for Hypothesis VIII was scattered.
suppoit

available in the Northeast and Far IVest for the foreign- born aspect

is

of Hypothesis VIII, i.e.

turnout.

No

On

that a large foreign-born population will decrease

the other hand, a large foreign-born population in the South and

North Central was likely

to result in low turnout.

aspect of Hypothesis VIII, i.e.

Corroboration of the second

that a large native-mixed parentage population

will lead to low turnout is not provided in Northeast mayor-council partisan
cities,

North Central mayor-council nonpartisan

partisan cities.

In all

manager

cities

cities

and other mayor-council cities this

aspect of Hypothesis VIII was confirmed.

It is

concluded that whether or not a

large ethnic population decreases turnout depends to

and election type, especially

in

and South mayor-council

mayor-council

some

cities.

extent upon region

Therefore, Hypothesis

VIII was not completely supported by the data.

Form

of

Government, Electoral System, Socio-Economic Characteristics

and Voter Turnout

-

Part III

.

Table

XXXVT

presents the combined effects of

socio-economic characteristics upon voter turnout for each region by form of

government and electoral system.

As

the table suggests, population growth and mobility, population

homogeneity, and social class characteristics appear

power upon voter turnout

in the

to

have greater predictive

Northeast and North Central.

Evidence for the
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Far West and South was rather inconclusive because
size

was

in the South the

sample

insufficient for further analysis on mayor-council partisan and

partisan cities, and the Far West had no partisan cities

.

manager

The highest degree

of

variance on voter turnout explained by the socio-economic variables as shown

Table

XXXVI was

manager partisan

in the

variation in

Northeast mayor-council partisan cities (89%) and

cities (86%).

variation in turnout

in

in

hi the

North Central area, 51 percent of the

mayor-council nonpartisan

manager nonpartisan

cities

cities

and 71 percent of the

were explained by these socio-economic

characteristics.
In

mayor-council nonpartisan

economic characteristics were also
voter turnout.

cities (46%) in the South, these socio-

significant in explaining the variation in

In other cities of the South

and

in all cities in the

characteristics were virtually useless as explanatory factors

in

Far West, these
voter turnout

variance

Summary
Although region vas treated as having an independent effect upon turnout,
it

of

was decidedly
form

of

difficult to

separate the influence of region from the influences

government and type

unequally across regions.

of electoral system, for these are distributed

However, some distinctive patterns did emerge

the analysis of the data of which note can be taken.

It

may be

recalled that Hypothesis

I

indicated that mayor-council

in
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governments were more
governments.

likely to experience greater voter turnout than

This assertion was supported by the data

in

Table XVII

manager

I.

Positing region as an intervening variable resulted in analyzing whether or not
this relationship also existed within region.

council cities had a larger turnout

in all

Table XIX revealed that mayor-

regions except the Northeast.

based on the analysis by region, Hypothesis
In

larger

Hypothesis

II,

it

I

again supported by the data.

is

was hypothesized

that turnout

corroborated by the findings as indicated

10% greater

in

in

partisan cities than turnout

Table XX.

in

was

Turnout was almost

Nonpartisan cities

in the

However,

nonpartisan cities.

analyzing the association within region (Table XXI) resulted
evidence.

likely to be

This assumption was

partisan cities than nonpartisan cities.

in

Thus,

inconclusive

in

North Central were likely

to

have a greater

turnout (2%) than partisan elections in the North Central, and turnout was the

same as

that of partisan elections in the Northeast.

Furthermore, nonpartisan-

ship in the Northeast and North Central were likely to result in greater voter

turnout than either partisan or nonpartisan elections

The only clear evidence
and South.
considered.
election

Because

the

to support Hypothesis

II

in the

South and Far West.

was provided

Far West had no partisan elections,

Therefore, based on the analysis

was more important

form of government, while

in the

Northeast

in the other

it

in

was evident

it

in the

Northeast

could not be

that

form

of

generating a large turnout than

regions form of government was likely
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to be

more

A word

significant.

or caution

is

advised.

As indicated

in

Table

XVII, the South and Far West had a lower voter turnout than the Northeast and

North Central.

But, the Far

West and South also

more manager and nonpartisan

cities, factors

had, as

shown

Table XIX,

in

which depress turnout, than the

other regions.

The data

in

Table XXII confirmed Hypothesis

partisan cities were likely to attract
other types.

more people

III, that

mayor-council

to the polls than cities with

But, controlling for the influences of region, in Table XXIII,

However, the absence

eliminated this relationship.

Far West and the paucity
virtually meaningless.

of

manager

cities in the Northeast

In the South and

appeared more significant

of partisan elections in the

rendered

this finding

North Central, the type of government

in stimulating a substantial turnout than electoral

system.
Nonpartisanship did have a negative effect upon turnout.

corroborates the results of some earlier studies.

g

Even

This finding

in cities with

governments, partisan elections increased turnout much greater than
cities with nonpartisan elections.

turnout whether they be held

in

manager

in

manager

Thus, partisan elections do stimulate greater

manager or mayor-council

cities.

Lee and Alford, o£. ciL; Lee,_o£. cit. Bollens and Schmandt, o£. ciL;
and Thomas Flinn, Local Government and Politics (Glenview, III. Scott Foresman
and Company, 1970), 39.
8

;

:
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The data also

indicated, as

was suggested

growing population resulted unequivocally

in a

in

Hypothesis

I

that a

diminution of turnout rate, form

of government, electoral system and region notwithstanding.

However,

confirmation for the second part of Hypothesis IV was lacking as a mobile
population did not

seem

to affect turnout negatively.

In fact,

where there was

high mobility, voter turnout was likely to increase, except in mayor-council

nonpartisan cities.

When

region was controlled only in the South did increased

mobility of population result in decreased turnout.

Concerning Hypothesis V and VI,

it

was found before considering

the

effect of region that in mayor-council cities, a higher percentage of educated

persons

in the population,

negatively affect turnout.

white collar workers and homeowners were likely to

Uneven support was provided

for the assumption that

voter turnout would increase as the percentage of high income persons

in the

population increases.

These findings were also applicable for

the

most

part, in cities with

partisan elections - mostly mayor-council governments - and in nonpartisan
elections, white collar workers depressed turnout.

The consideration

of region as an intervening variable resulted in a

continuing correlation between white collar workers and low voter turnout

except in the South.

Education (college educated) most often resulted

turnout, especially in the Far West and North Central and only in

in

lower

mayor-
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council partisan cities of the Northeast and South.

Based upon

the data, conclusive corroboration of Hypothesis VII and

VIII was not apparent.

If

anything, evidence providing a partial refutation of

these two Hypotheses occurred.

Populations which were socially and culturally

diverse experienced greater turnout than a homogeneous population.

In other

words, a high percentage of non-white persons and foreign -born and native

persons

in the

population were not likely to lead to higher voter turnout.

However, because the concentration

was

of a non-white population in

not great, negative influences on turnout were evident.

born and native populations

manager

cities than in

(ethnicity)

mayor-council

manager

Substantial foreign-

increased turnout at a greater rate
cities.

cities

in

But, foreign born populations were

likely to decrease turnout in mayor-council partisan cities regardless of region.

Although non-white population was positively associated with mayor-council
cities, this did not hold true in the South

and Far West.

Region as an intervening variable affects the relationship between voter
turnout and socio-economic characteristics as significantly as form of govern-

ment and electoral systems.
economic characteristics

As explanatory factors

it is,

therefore,

more

of voter turnout and socio-

useful to rely upon

government and electoral systems, for as was discovered

in the

form

of

previous chapter

certain socio-economic factors are found in particular governmental forms and

electorcal types

more

so than others, regardless of region.
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CHAPTER V I

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The

local electorate in

American society has

aroused

to its electoral responsibility

indeed,

it is

not been sufficiently

and the significance of local politics,

discreetly and acutely aware that voting

is

significance in deciding the real issues of local politics.

over 50 percent of those persons eligible

to vote

or,

of little value and
In this study well

remained away from the

polls.

Consequently, municipal elections continue to attract only a minority of the
electorate - a minority

who must

vote into office those persons

and decide paramount policy issues concerning
city elections in

all local

who

residents.

Los Angeles over a period of two decades revealed

shall

A

make

study of

that voter

turnout ranged from 10 to 61 percent, with an average of 41 percent of those
eligible to vote.

the "better

However, some

find this situation healthy, for

more capable" elements

of local citizenry - those

it

insures that

who are better

educated, better informed, and of higher socio-economic status generally ultimately decide

who

shall hold office.

But the majority of the local electorate

Lawrence O'Rourke, Voting Behavior in the Forty-Five Cities of Los
Angeles County (Los Angeles: Bureau of Government Research, University of
1

California, 1953).
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must be awakened

to the fact that

it

cannot afford to abdicate

of voting for officials to a few - regardless of

the

mere

act of voting for a

elections, undoubtedly,

mayor or

insignificant

for councilmen.

must be overcome.

for an apathetic municipal electorate.

how

,

there

the kinds of persons

and as

Apathy

is likely to

in

municipal

in public office,

be a pervasive

community as

in the

to

as to expenditure levels

Under such circumstances, there

to public policies.

considers

it

But Charles Adrian states that "the

may be widespread agreement

who are wanted

responsibility

There are obviously many reasons

principal reason for apathy in municipal elections,

consensus, i.e.

its

is little

incentive

o

for any but the

most conscientious voter

observed that "many

to

go to the polls. "

Hugh Bone

cities are controlled or strongly influenced

periods of time by what
bipartisan composition.

is

loosely viewed as

'the

establishment,

over long
'

with strong

Aided by broadly composed municipal leagues and

citizens associations, its supporters can be depended on to turn out and to have

much

to

do with the attention or lack of attention focused on the city election.

This effort affects both the turnout and the types of voters going

This study was undertaken
turnout in municipal elections.
of

to

The attempt has been

to

analyze certain forms
act as stimulants

Charles Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York:

Book Co.

,

"3

explore further the phenomenon of voter

government and socio-economic characteristics which may

2

to the polls.

McGraw

Hill

1961), 93.

^Hugh Bone, American Politics and
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1965), 528.

the Party

System

(3d ed.

;

New York
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or determinants and inhibitors to municipal voter turnout.

Most of the previous

studies on voter turnout have been conducted on national elections; therefore

many

of the assumptions concerning causal elements of turnout

from such

studies.

were derived

However, a few studies have investigated voter turnout

locally with similar assumptions as a basis.

This study not only investigated

and tested previous assumptions about the local electorate, but introduced
region as an intervening variable.
of earlier works, but in

In

some cases

most cases,

the findings confirm those

they differ.

Generally speaking, socio-economic characteristics were insignificant
in positively affecting the level of

voter turnout

in

municipal elections.

In

every

instance, they accounted for well below 50 percent of the variation of turnout

But within the limited parameters of accountable variation, some

in all cities.

pertinent associations between such socio-economic characteristics and turnout developed.

Following are some conclusions resulting from the analysis

of socio-economic characteristics:

1.

A

2.

Cities with a highly mobile population did not necessarily

rapidly growing population led to a reduced voter turnout.

experience low voter turnout.
3.

Cities with a higher percentage of well-educated persons did not
necessarily have a larger turnout than cities with a high per-

centage of less-well -educated persons. In general, education
(well educated and less well educated) decreased voter turnout. In mayor-council cities, however, a large less-well-

educated population reduced turnout.
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4.

Basically a high percentage of white collar workers and
homeowners, factors normally associated with high voter
turnout, had a negative effect upon turnout. Income (high

and low) resulted
5.

in

increased turnout.

Cities with a large non-white population did not necessarily
have low voter turnout. But in manager cities, non-white

population was negatively related to turnout, while in
mayor-council cities a large non-white population in-

creased turnout, especially in mayor-council partisan
cities in the Northeast and North Central.
6.

Ethnicity (i.e., foreign -born and native -mixed parentage
persons) in large proportions in the population led to
increased turnout in elections. Also, a substantial
foreign-born and native -mixed parentage population
resulted in a larger turnout in manager cities than in

mayor-council

cities.

The conclusions derived from
1.

this analysis

were:

Cities with mayor-council governments have a larger
turnout than cities with manager governments, except
in the Northeast, where manager cities had a slightly

higher turnout than mayor-council cities.
2.

Basically,

manager governments had

the effect of

discouraging a large turnout.
3.

Cities with nonpartisan elections had a lower voter
turnout than cities with partisan elections.

4.

Cities with mayor-council-partisan governments had

a higher turnout than cities with other forms. But when
this relationship was viewed within regions, only in the

North Central was it likely that mayor-council-partisan
cities had a higher turnout than cities with other
combinations of governmental forms and electoral
systems.
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5.

Region as an intervening variable had greater significance
as an explanatory factor for assessing political structures
as determinants of voter turnout than socio-economic
characteristics as determinants of turnout.

The above are

the

municipal voter turnout.

more

salient conclusions

As with

emerging from

conclusions, denuded of the shield of

all

interpretation and explication, they stand virtually meaningless.

one

is

compelled

explain.

this study of

Therefore,

query what they mean or what do they actually say or

to

Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will deal with the

implications of these conclusions for voting

and voter turnout

in

in

municipal elections

in particular

general.

Because no distinction was made between

cities with the elected

and cities with the appointed mayor, care must be exercised

in

mayor

assessing the

relationship between mayor-council cities and voter turnout since an appointed

mayor may be

in a

when compared

similar relative position as a manager

to an elected

mayor.

But

it

in affecting

turnout

can only be speculated at this

point that turnout would probably be still larger in cities with appointed

mayors

than in cities with managers.

Mayor-council

cities

embody

the basic elements of acute social

cleavages and tension which leads to heightened social activity

This condition ultimately results

in

greater tunrout

in particular.

in local elections of

people

using the vote to express their grievances or their support for particular
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candidates and policies.

Also, the

mayor

is

more

visible and

more

of a focal

point for the electorate to rally around and support
or on which to vent their

spleen and exercise a protest vote.

being non -political.

Furthermore, he makes no pretense of

The competition and

conflict which exist between the

mayor

and not only ambitious mayorality-oriented councilmen, but councilmen
who may
be genuinely opposed
and turnout

By

in a

to the

mayor's policies increase the excitement,

interest,

municipal election.

contrast,

manager governments are located

in cities with the

basic

elements of a middle-class society, factors which supposedly heighten turnout.
But, because these cities are essentially homogeneous in character, they are

basically consensual and the inhabitants express a certain self-satisfaction

with the way things are run which ultimately depresses or decreases the turnout
at local elections.

Partisan elections generate cleavages, divisions and tensions which
turn increase political activity and turnout.

The interplay

of political parties

upon the electorate and the exhortation by parties encouraging people

combined with the

fact that

many people depend on

in

to vote,

party labels as guides to

voting undoubtedly engender a larger turnout for local elections than where non-

partisanship exists.

Nonpartisanship

may have succeeded

as part of the reform movement;

it

in

accomplishing some of

its

unquestionably has not brought about a

goals
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more democratic

local politics through the

greater electoral participation
in

which fewer people turn out

encouragement and achievement of

at the local level. 4

to vote in

It

has resulted in a situation

municipal elections than

elections held under a partisan electoral system.

in

those

Without the cues provided by

party labels and the possibility for a "protest vote, " sufficient
motivation for
voting for

some people has been

effectively eliminated by nonpartisanship.

However, with over 60 percent of

cities presently utilizing the nonpartisan ballot,

and the prospects that more cities will eventually adopt

it,

the dichotomy between

nonpartisan and partisan elections will become unimportant and lose
if it

its validity,

hasn't already, as a device for analyzing the differences in voter turnout

between

the

do now,

in

two systems.

some cases

Parties will continue

overtly; but other

more

to exist

and operate as they

analytically useful and pertinent
5

political lines will develop, as has

been suggested already,

which may be more

effective in stimulating turnout.

For some other consequences of nonpartisanship, see Charles Adrian,
"Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections, " American Political
Science Review, 46 (September, 1952), 766-776; Richard Childs, Civic
Victories (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Eugene Lee and Robert Alford,
"Voter Turnout in American Cities, " American Political Science Review 62
(September, 1968), 796; Eugene Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley:
,

University of California Press, 1960).
5

Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group-Voting
Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (Spring, 1966), 79.
,

in

Non-Partisan Elections,

"
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Where

the

mayor and councilmen campaign with

the benefit of party

label, their character, visibility,

and notoriety,

image and efforts

would undoubtedly be of such a nature that

in their behalf,

would stimulate a large turnout.

What

is

to

say nothing of the party's

also significant

councilman are visible symbols for protest and support.

it

mayor and

is that the

They are also perceived

as the holders of power and authority.

The mayor as well as

the

generate the necessary interest

councilmen campaigning on the party label can
in the election for a

huge turnout.

Councilmen

give voters a certain personal attachment to the campaign and election.

attachment reflects in various forms of support, but for most people

it

This
is

the

casting of a ballot for their particular choice.
In their study, Wolfinger and Field concluded that "one can do a

much

better job of predicting a city's political forms by knowing what part of the

country

it is in

than by knowing anything about the composition of

They continue: "The reasons

for this

may

lie in

region

in this

in

0
municipal political systems. "

study

is

to their

The conclusion concerning

similar to that of Wolfinger and Field.

^Raymond Wolfinger and John

Having a know-

O. Field, "Political Ethos and the

Structure of City Government, " American Political Science Review
1966), 320.

population. "

certain regional historical

experiences related to the influx of immigrants and the responses

needs reflected

its

,

60 (June,
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ledge about the regions of the country provides a clearer and
more distinctive
picture of the forms of government therein than the socio-economic
characteristics,

and

this in turn tells us

instance, the Far West has

more about voter

turnout in each region.

For

more manager governments and nonpartisan

elections than the Northeast, which has

more mayor-council

types and partisan

Likewise, the Far West has a lower voter turnout than the North-

elections.

east.

Socio-economic characteristics are more

more

intermittent change than governmental forms.

volatile, hence subject to

Therefore, knowing the

section of the country says less about socio-economic characteristics per se
than governmental forms.

Although this study basically concurs with Ruth Dixon,
of mobility in the

from voting,

that turnout is not necessarily hindered

by high

quirements vary tremendously from locale
is

a high level

American population makes residence requirements especially

significant as factors barring persons

quirement

’’that

"

7

level mobility.

to locale.

reasonably short, while in others

the findings here suggest

it

In

some

Residency recities the

is unjustifiably long.

re-

However,

given the type of people who are usually highly mobile - white collar workers

7

Ruth Dixon, ’’Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections,” (unpublished
M. A. thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1966), 6.
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the suspicion is that they are not deterred

from immediately becoming

politically

active, registered and eventually voting.

With Congress lecently passing a law limiting long residency requirement
as a prerequisite in voting for the Presidency,
future, with increasing mobility

ments for voting

among

in local elections

three months or less in

in

can be expected that in the near

the electorate, that residency require-

may uniformly be

many American

The socio-economic variables
are commonly used

it

limited to no

cities.

utilized in this study, variables which

such studies, contributed very

However,

variation in voter turnout.

it

is still

little to

possible to

findings, even within this limited area of significance.
in the face of conventional

wisdom.

of education in their study.

were found

to

g

more than

the overall

comment on

Some

the

of the findings fly

Lee and Alford also found

this to

be true

White collar workers, homeowners, and education

be inversely related to turnout

in this study.

It is

suggested,

however, as Lee and Alford did, that the relationship may be curvilinear rather
than linear.

They observed

that ’’although better-educated individuals

may

indeed vote more frequently than less-educated individuals, less well-educated

communities vote more

(or at least not less) than

This same analysis

is

also applicable to the findings of white collar

workers, homeowners, and education
^

9

Lee and Alford, o£.
Ibid.

9
well-educated communities.”

cit.

,

in this study.

805.

Sufficient motivation
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growing out of discussion

of issues

and

in

some cases

will attract all ranges of voters to the polls in large

socio-economic status.
had a stake

in the

For instance,

it

on the other hand, renters have a stake

numbers, regardless of

was thought

community they would be more
in the

the appeal of personalities

that

because homeowners

apt to vote then renters.

community as

But.

well; they pay

property taxes indirectly, of course, and they are equally affected by public
Therefore,

policies.

it

can be expected that

in

communities with substantial

renters, these renters will contribute substantially to the voter turnout rate if

not

more

than homeowners, at least equally.

These socio-economic variables did

were they

much

predictive power nor

mayor-

significant in explaining a lower or higher turnout in either

council partisan or nonpartisan and

However,

not have

in

manager partisan

cent to the variation in turnout.

manager partisan or nonpartisan

cities.

cities in the Northeast, they did contribute 86 per-

In

manager nonpartisan

cities in the

Central area they accounted for only 71 percent of the variation
both mayor-council partisan and mayor-council nonpartisan

North

in the vote.

in the

In

Northeast, these

socio-economic variables contributed a mere 43 percent and 89 percent,
respectively, to the variation in voter turnout.

The undeniable

situation which prevailed in cities with either

mayor-

council partisan or nonpartisan and manager partisan or nonpartisan govern-

mental and electoral systems was that the greatest variance

in

voter turnout was
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left

unexplained by the socio-economic variables.

affluency of the

American electorate generally,

However, given the relative

the increasing political

awareness

and consciousness of the electroate, socio-economic variables should become
less relevant and significant as determinants of voter turnout.

The data also indicated

that a politically, culturally and socially

heterogeneous community resulted

in an

and conflicts generate spontaneously

increased turnout

in highly

at the polls.

Cleavages

heterogeneous cities, and they

eventually are resolved or ameliorated in the political arena.

For the great

majority of non-white, foreign-born and native populations, who are the sources
of conflict and cleavage, their only contribution to resolution or dampening of
conflict

may be

the ballot box.

They therefore rely on

influencing policy

decisions and the selection of the decision makers through turning out in large

numbers.
Large non -white, foreign -born and native-mixed parentage populations
increased turnout in cities.
ship.

In

manager

cities,

Non -white population exhibited

however, only a substantial non-white population led

to depressing the turnout rate.

non -white population
that in those cities

encouragement

is the

The largest

Black American.

where Blacks have

to vote,

the closest relation-

single group which comprises the

Some

earlier studies have shown

the opportunity and the necessary

they turn out in equal or greater numbers than
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whites.
only

10

Furthermore, voting may be the primary and,

means whereby Blacks can attempt

to influence

Whites

may

utilize

such avenues as a substitute for voting.

find private

avenues more conducive

in

some cases,

the

and affect policy decisions.

to their

needs and thus

Mayor-council

cities have the

tendency to make available the opportunity, and they have the necessary presence
of stimuli to vote,

An

more so

than

additional finding

had a stronger association

was

manager

that the foreign-born and the native population

to turnout in

The expectation was

council cities.

cities.

manager

cities than they

had

that the native population would be

closely related to turnout in manager cities.

It is little

of non-white voting.

It

seems

mayor-

more

surprising, however, to

find foreign-born population with a closer relationship to turnout in
cities than mayor-council.

in

manager

that they would follow the general pattern

However, as some have argued, ethnic saliency may be

a thing of the past, for ethnics have been finally assimilated into the American
political

system.

11

not only

move

manager

to

As ethnics

10

1960 ),

Robert A. Dahl,
294 - 295

rise in socio-economic status they apparently

cities but

become

Who Governs (New Haven:

.

^Wolfinger and

less attached to ethnic considerations.

Field, o£. cit.

Yale University Press,
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Turnout should continue

to

be high where there

is

a substantial admixture

of non-whites, foreign-born and native population, for
these are

ingredients which

make

for conflict,

sometimes

electorally expresses itself at the polls.

violent,

some

of the

which ultimately

Foreign -born people seem

to

adopted or assimilated generally the orientation of the native population
they, as well as the natives, turn out to vote in greater
cities than in

mayor-council

ethnic voting has not vanished, the probability
in

manager

Forms

of

1
'

manager

is that

clear that

cities.

Although

ethnic salience

is

radically

instituted to confer electoral and political

advantages on one group of people over another group.

It is

manager

cities.

government are

introduced, therefore,

in

in that

This also reflects the fact that the foreign-

cities.

born have placed their fortunes on ’'non-political

diminished

numbers

have

may

hinder or encourage

some structures do

in fact

The structures so

full political participation.

generate a large turnout while others

depress voter turnout.

The basic conclusion drawn from

this study is that political structures

are very important determinants of voter turnout
that

in

municipal elections, and

forms of government are most significant than socio-economic variables

as causal elements in voter turnout.

Therefore, studies of voter turnout would

do well to emphasize more the role and effect of political structures on the
electorate and ultimately on turnout.

,
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VOTER TURNOUT
We

are interested

in

IN

LOCAL ELECTIONS

voter turnout for the last two local elections.

(PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTION APPROPRIATE TO YOUR FORM OF

LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
A.

YOUR (CITY, VILLAGE, TOWN) DIRECTLY ELECTS ITS MAYOR,
record below the total voter turnout in the last two general elections for
mayor.

IN

Year

B.

of Election

Total Voter Turnout for Office of

Mayor

YOUR CITY ELECTS ONLY COUNCILMEN OR COMMISSIONERS i.e
DOES NOT DIRECTLY ELECT THE MAYOR) record below the total votes
IF

(

.

,

received in the last two general elections for council or commission and
the number of vacancies filled.
Total Votes Received by All

Council or Commission

Year

of Election

Candidates

Number

of

Vacancies

Filled
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